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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Reflecting on the other MA essays 
Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts became a major topic of scientific debate after the 
events in Yugoslavia etc. The ethnic tide peaked in 2000, at least here, at the Institute 
of political science, University of Oslo. The majority of the essays on Yugoslavia 
consist of rational choice/game theory inspired investigations1. The authors justify the 
use of this approach with the complicated nature of the conflicts and the need to sim-
plify their studies. Second, they defend the use of formal, consistent, and precise 
models with the necessity for rigorous reasoning and the aspiration to generalise the 
conclusions. The students repeat a line borrowed from Hovi & Rasch (1996: 3) “Sim-
ple models shall lead the way to more complicated explanatory and predictive mod-
els”. 
These essays can be criticised in a number of points. Empirically, the students use 
no primary Albanian and Serbian sources. To quote Foucault (2001: 276), “About 
them it could be said, rather, that they are eaters of history as others have prepared it. 
They consume it pre-processed”. Even secondary sources, mainly foreign journalists, 
had few contacts between ‘the natives’, and failed to grasp the complexity of the con-
flict and appreciate the presence of ‘the others’ in the Albanian political discourse. 
The empirical shortcomings serve only to reinforce the theoretical weaknesses. 
First, it is impossible to judge the relevance of ‘variables’ that are omitted from the 
analysis in order to build a simplified model. Second, the students try to discover the 
preferences through media descriptions of historical events and to assign these pref-
erences to the actors. They simply neglect or are unable to study how the actors them-
selves constructed and understood their own preferences, their justification of these 
preferences and the underlying cultural codes. On the contrary, we should study the 
political decisions along the same lines that the actors followed during the process of 
decision-making. Third, the students never discuss the persistence of the analysed 
variables/ preferences and their corresponding effects on the future human behaviour. 
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Forth, the students speak in terms of universal/ superior rationality as the antipode of 
Balkan nonsense. Neither the actors nor the students possess such universal rational-
ity. Consequently, we need another research design that allows us to reveal, criticise, 
and contest the perception of the world through the investigation of the actors’ own 
meaning-construction. 
1.2 The object of the essay 
The theme of this essay is the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs about the 
political status of Kosovo. However, the theme represents only the framework of the 
essay. The formulation of the research object helps us to focus the research. (Taylor 
2001a) The formulation of the object is based on the theoretical assumption that 
“When persons engage in conduct, that conduct takes on a meaning or meanings as a 
result of the interpretations that are available in the language from which the inter-
preters select. When we therefore, review the sets of constructs relating to conduct 
that exists in a language, we are viewing not only the horizons of possible speech but 
also the horizons of possible actions. The possibilities of action, then, exits, in the 
language of a culture, and the actions that actually emerge are presented as a result of 
the controlling interpretations, those with general legitimacy”. (Shapiro quoted in 
Neumann 2001: 38) 
The point made by the discourse analysts is that the meaning construction allows 
people to come to shared understandings as the basis of identity and collective action. 
Therefore, in order to understand the done and the possible, the alliances, solidarity, 
mobilisation and a host of other movement processes, it is fundamental to study the 
meaning that the actors constructed to guide, organise and give legitimacy to their 
actions. Even violence, let alone normal political actions (Mathisen 1997: 4), is con-
ceived, defined, organised and executed inside these possible meanings. 
Therefore, the object of the essay is to study the Albanian side/role in the con-
flict between the Albanians and the Serbs by analysing the political discourse 
(meaning making) of the Albanian elite in Kosovo. Foucault (1991: 385) defined 
this strategy as, “I have never tried to analyze anything whatsoever from the point of 
view of politics, but always to ask politics what it had to say about the problems with 
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which it was confronted. I question it about the positions it takes and the reasons it 
gives for this”. Explicitly, the object of the thesis is to deconstruct the Albanian 
meaning-construction in order to reveal how different Albanian elite groups, in their 
challenge to the official Serb discourse, constructed competing realities concerning: 
 The definition of the conflict and its causes 
 The definition of the solution 
 The definition of the means to achieve the political solutions and their legiti-
macy 
However, Foucault did not reduce his research strategy to ask politics what it had 
to say about the problems. Because, discourse is both a system of possibilities that 
gives us the means to mobilise and organise in collective action, and simultaneously a 
system of limitations that prevents us from producing certain representations and con-
sequently, participating in certain types of collective action. Discourses decide what it 
is norm and what it is not producing power outcomes or effects. Discourses define 
and establish the ‘truth’ at particular moments and invalidate (or try to do so) other 
representations. Further, discourses not only establish truth, but they have also mate-
rial effects. Therefore, the goal of discourse analysis is not only to reveal the mean-
ing, but also its power (or political) effects in the human activity. Foucault (2001: 
230) declared that this was the essence of his method: “To put the matter clearly: my 
problem is to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of 
truth”. 
1.3 Do we need another essay about Kosovo/Yugoslavia? 
The essay is part of my MA degree. Why should you read it? First, the Kosovo crisis 
had a deep impact in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Milošević gave the fatal blow to 
the idea of Yugoslavism with the coerced abrogation of the autonomy of Kosovo. 
(Cviic 1995; Biberaj 1993; Simic 1998) 
Second, the observers considered Kosovo as the most possible place to erupt in 
armed violence. However, the Albanian armed resistance began only after 1997. 
(Biberaj 1993; Cviic 1995; Malcolm 1998; Simic 1998; Vickers 1998) It is interest-
ing to understand the processes that inhibited the explosion for almost 7 years. 
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Third, the diversity of the Albanian political thought remained unrecognised. The 
foreign actors failed to perceive the presence of the others and to some, the first ac-
tions of the KLA and the popular support for them, came as a surprise. The essay 
shall help to document how the actors formed the conflict, its solution, and their 
strategies. These elements of meaning are significant and persistent. 
Forth, the studies about the conflict in Yugoslavia should not be concentrated only 
on one or two political leaders, but include the intellectuals also. The intellectuals 
formed the conceptual terrain and even became political leaders2. 
Fifth, the conflict remains frozen and unresolved. The longer it takes to decide, the 
fewer the options are going to be. The description and the comparison of the Alba-
nian discourses can reveal the possibilities that lay ahead. 
1.4 The structure of the essay 
The essay is built according to the traditional University of Oslo model. It consists of 
two main parts. Part 1 establishes the theoretical underpinnings of the essay. Chapter 
1 represent the object of the paper. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the problems related to 
methodology and method. These two chapters define the discourse analysis as re-
search tool and the method used in this essay focusing on the subjects and the use of 
discursive materials. Chapter 4 gives a brief description of the events preceding the 
abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo. 
Part 2 contains the chapters 5, 6 and 7 that explain in detail the political ideas of 
the main Albanian political groups. The representation of their ideas is structured so it 
facilitates the comparison between groups. Chapter 8 summarises and compares the 
ideas emphasising the common points as well as distinctions between political 
groups. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Methodology: A general view 
The research design depends on the methodological assumptions concerning the un-
derstanding of the social world and the nature of the human knowledge. Therefore, it 
is necessary to begin by clarifying the methodological foundations of the essay. (Ag-
ger 1991; Giddens 1982; Bevir 1999a; Neumann & Sand 2000; Utaker 2000; Billing 
2001; Mehan 2001; Wetherell 2001b; Mathisen 1997; Mjøset 1991) We should dis-
cern between methodology and method. Morrow & Brown (1994: 36) define meth-
odology as “… an overall strategy of constructing specific types of knowledge … 
justified by a variety of metatheoretical assumptions. Methodology is thus inevitably 
prescriptive because it attempts to legitimate the use of particular methods in ways 
that are consistent with the development of the specific theory in question”. 
A separate branch of science, metatheory (theory about theory) studies the meth-
odological assumptions and the implications of the research conclusions. Metatheory 
consist of four pillars: ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics. Two pillars, ontol-
ogy and epistemology, are of a special importance to discourse analysis. Ontology is 
the study of the nature of being, i.e. what the world consists of. Epistemology is the 
theory of the status of knowledge, the critical study of knowledge validity, methods, 
and scope, i.e. epistemology tells us how to study the world. Epistemology defines 
criteria that determine if knowledge is scientific. Morrow & Brown (1996: 54) write, 
“… ontologies are linked closely to epistemologies because it is necessary to have a 
conception of the nature of social reality before one proposes to justify a scientific 
analysis of it”. Different sets of metatheoretical assumptions envisage different 
statuses to social research. (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 1999; Neumann 2001; Tay-
lor 2001a) 
Method, on the other side, refers to the specific techniques of scientific research 
such as observation, interviews, questionnaires, etc. All the MA essays written at the 
Institute of political science, University of Oslo, have a compulsory chapter about the 
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research method. One definition is always present: “Method is a line of action, an 
instrument to resolve problems and to arrive at new knowledge. Any instrument that 
serves this purpose is part of the arsenal of methods.” (Hellevik 1991: 14) 
There is nothing wrong with this definition per se. The problem consists on the 
tacit acceptance of the objectivist/positivist methodological assumptions that follows. 
Ontologically, they represent the empirical facts as independent of our conscience. 
Epistemologically, they aim to establish causal relationships between objective social 
facts, and generalise the conclusions in the form of all-embracing and invariant laws. 
They cheer the impartial, dogma and value free researcher that studies the phenomena 
from outside any social/cultural milieu. Even if the students admit a certain personal 
belonging, they claim to treat the case from an absolute ethical position. 
A critical stance to positivism is de rigueur because social life differs from nature 
and social sciences differ methodologically from natural sciences. First, social facts 
do not simply live up to the X-file logo ‘the truth is out there’. “Social facts are par-
ticularly difficult (some say obdurate or stubborn) because they cannot be taken for 
granted.” (Morrow & Brown 1996: 44) Our experiences are not phenomenologically 
pure, products of pure experience and reason, but mediated through abstract models. 
(Potter & Wetherell 1987; Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992; McNay 1994; Bevir 1999a; 
Neumann & Sand 2000; Utaker 2000; Røssaak 2000; Billing 2001; Mehan 2001; 
Smart 2002) Even if we reduce our understanding of reality to pure perception, we 
still need models to organise extensive empirical materials. Perceiving disconnected 
facts does not constitute knowledge. (Mathisen 1997; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 
1999) Kuhn (quoted in Neumann 2001: 31) wrote, “... something like a paradigm is 
prerequisite to perception itself”. Therefore, we conceive, arrange, and interpret so-
cial data according to distinct theoretical models. Morrow & Brown (1994: 44) em-
phasise that, “Generally nobody even bothers to collect or produce data until a theory 
renders them of sufficient interest”. 
Second, Giddens (1982: 13) writes, “… we cannot treat human activities as though 
they were determined by causes in the same way as natural events are. We have to 
grasp what I would call the double involvement of individuals and institutions: we 
create society at the same time as we are created by it”. We do not simply respond 
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instinctively to the outside world. “Human beings are something substantially differ-
ent from the rats of behaviourists”. (Mjøset 1991: 175) We contemplate and posses 
the ability to predict the result of our actions and adjust our behaviour accordingly. 
(Mathisen 1997; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 1999; Neumann 2001) 
Third, the status of the observer/researcher as objective and socially/politically un-
biased is highly doubtful. (Agger 1991; Foucault 2001; Neumann 2001; Taylor 2001) 
The relationship between the researcher and his/her world is reflexive. The observer 
remains part of a distinctive social environment, possessing distinctive models to col-
lect and interpret social facts. Rather than constructing a new objective model, the 
researcher adds a new model to actors’ own models. 
We should criticise also the other extreme. Subjectivists reject the direct perception 
of the outside reality. Ontologically, they reject the comprehension of the true reality 
because we mediate it through our subjective models. Solipsism, the extreme variant 
of subjectivism, denies any possibility to perceive the world outside our conscience. 
Epistemologically, the source of our knowledge is not reality, but our intellectual 
models. 
The set of the ontological/epistemological assumptions shapes our ambitions (lim-
its) regarding the scientific research and social action. According to positivists, the 
goal of science is to discover general invariable laws that decide the future. These 
social laws restrain the human behaviour and allow no room for human intentions. 
(Taylor 2001a) Subjectivists search for explanations that capture specific peculiarities 
of the cases. For the extreme subjectivists, there are no two comparable cases. Hence, 
ontologically, they reject the idea of general models and the search for ideographic 
explanations. Epistemologically, the subjectivists fell in voluntarism claiming that the 
actors steer their actions according to their intentions un-checked by any objective 
determinants. (Morrow & Brown 1996) 
2.2 Discourse- a definition 
Positivism and subjectivism represent the two extremes of the possible combination 
sets of ontological/epistemological assumptions. Between them lie a number of post-
structuralist/postmodernist methodological approaches that “… try to mediate be-
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tween naturalistic and humanistic perspectives”. (Morrow & Brown 1996: 6) The 
discourse analysis is one of these approaches. It is an important research strategy, 
although we are far from experiencing a Foucauldian revolution in political sciences. 
(Brass 2000) First, the understanding of contemporary societies as mediated through 
discourse has emphasised the importance of discourse and triggered the formulation 
of several discursive strategies. Second, the data used in social studies are typically 
discursive. Third, poststructuralism and postmodernism have emphasised the episte-
mological implications regarding the formation of human knowledge. (Foucault 
2001; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Hook 2001; Wetherell et al 2001b; Neumann 2001) 
It is crucial to begin by clarifying the notion discourse. (Alvesson & Karreman 
2000; Taylor 2001a) Etymologically, the term ‘discourse’ comes from Medieval 
Latin ‘discursus’ and means ‘running about’, or ‘to run, to enter, to and fro’. (Chia 
2000, www.Dictionary.com) English vocabularies define discourse as 1. Conversa-
tion; 2. A formal treatment of a subject in speech or writing; 3. To speak or write 
(about) at length. (Neumann 2001) In general, the notion discourse “… means pas-
sages of connected writing or speech”. (Hall 2001a: 72) 
Discourse analysts (Taylor 2001b: 317) define discourse as “… historically vari-
able ways of specifying knowledges and truths, whereby knowledges are socially 
constructed and produced by effects of power and spoken of in terms of truth”. Dis-
course includes meaning-phenomena, such as attitudes, values, beliefs, and ideas that 
shape reality. Discourse analysts do not treat concrete written or oral language-use as 
a source of information about a concrete conflict, but rather as a resource to study 
meaning, i.e. how individuals speak about the conflict and why they do so. (McNay 
1994; Briggs 1996; Foucault 2001; Neumann 2001; Wetherell 2001a; Wodak 2002; 
Sunderland & Litosseliti 2002) 
Foucault (quoted in Sunderland & Litosseliti 2002: 13) wrote that discourses are 
“… practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak”. Foucault em-
phasised that discourse is not simple language, but the constituting process of reality 
that invent (in a perpetuum semiosis to use the term of C.S. Peirce) social institutions, 
modes of thought and subjectivity. Discourse shapes even something as tangible as 
nourishment. What we eat depends on taboos rather than on objective nutritious val-
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ues. (Foucault 1991, 2001; Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992; Schaanning 2000; Bevir 
1999a; Utaker 2000; Scheurich 2000; Wetherell 2001a; Neumann 2001, 2002) 
Foucault avoided abstract questions about the existence of things. Instead, he 
asked how our concepts about things function and shape our society. (Rabinow 1991; 
Neumann 2002) Foucault conceived discourse as encompassing reality (objectivity) 
and argued that things have no own, innate meaning. They take a specific meaning 
only as object of discourse, and cannot exist outside it. Meaning/knowledge is a 
product of discourse and not contained in the things themselves. (Hall 2001a; 
Wetherell 2001c) 
Therefore, competing groups refer to the same event, but describe it differently ac-
cording to their own discursive models. (Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992; Jacobs 1996; 
Kane 2000; Mehan 2001) Laclau & Mouffe (quoted in Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 
3) explain, “An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in 
the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their 
specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions 
of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is de-
nied is not that such objects exist externally to though, but the rather different asser-
tion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions 
of emergence”. 
Discourse is a system of possibilities. Henriques et al (quoted in Kendall & Wick-
ham 1999: 41) write, “In practice discourses delimit what can be said, while provid-
ing the spaces- the concepts, metaphors, models, analogies, for making new state-
ments within any specific discourse”. Discourse does not place individuals in one 
distinctive position (Utaker 2000), but “Rather it … provides an array of ‘subject po-
sitions’ which individuals may occupy.” (McNay 1994: 68) 
Meanings as products of discourses are relational, indexical, and dialogic. (Potter 
& Wetherell 1987; Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992; Utaker 2000; Billing 2001; Wetherell 
2001a; Hall 2001b; Sunderland & Litosseliti 2002; Neumann 2002) Carabine (2001: 
273) writes, “… discourse interacts with, and is mediated by, other discourses to pro-
duce new, different, and forceful ways of presenting the issue”. First, we formulate 
new statements by choosing/combining/juxtaposing diverse pre-existing statements, 
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especially the dominant ones, to construct true subjects, to produce power and effects. 
Second, the meaning conveyed by discursive statements depends on the discursive 
context within which we use the statements. Different discursive context allocate dif-
ferent meanings to the same statement. Third, we ‘discover’ the ‘true’ nature of 
things by engaging in dialogue with each other. Bakhtin (Hall 2001b: 329) pointed 
out that meaning does not belong to one speaker, but it is a collective product of dia-
logue between many speakers. “’Le Penseur’3 may be alone with his thoughts but 
those thoughts bear the marks of social contexts and historical struggles over mean-
ing.” (Wetherell 2001b: 187) 
The argumentative and rhetorical character of discourse enables us to defend our 
views, persuade the others, and challenge rival representations. Political struggle is a 
struggle of discourses. (McNay 1994) Therefore, the discourse is functional. We can 
find acts of opposition/challenge in every historic period as a response to dilemmas. 
The ultimate effect of opposition is the adoption of new truths (values, beliefs, etc). 
(Foucault 1991, 2001; Digeser 1992; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Bevir 1999a, 1999b; 
Kendall & Wickham 1999; Neumann 2001; Carabine 2001, Wetherell 2001a) 
Normalisation makes statements to seem uniform, necessary, and logical. 
(Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992; Sand 2000) However, meaning/knowledge is contin-
gent, and historically situated. “Things meant something and were ‘true’, he [Fou-
cault] argued, only within a specific historical context. Foucault did not believe that 
the same phenomena would be found across different historical periods. He thought 
that, in each period, discourse produced forms of knowledge, objects, subjects and 
practices of knowledge, which differed radically from period to period, with no nec-
essary continuity between them.” (Hall 2001a: 74) Hence, Foucault did not speak of 
universals, absolute truths, but of discursive formations, (compounds of statements) 
that sustains regimes of truth. (Rabinow 1991) Foucault (2001: 131) summarised, 
“Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth- that is, the types of 
discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanc-
tioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true”. 
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2.3 The role of the subject 
Foucault placed discourse at the centre and argued that discourse constructs reality 
including subjects. However, in his latest writings, Foucault revised his ideas regard-
ing the status of subject (Hall 2001a) and even declared, “… it is not power, but the 
subject, that is the general theme of my research”. (Foucault 2001: 327) He opposed 
both the traditional idea of an autonomous and rational actor that acts under self-
imposed and self-created commands and the Marxist understanding that the eco-
nomic, social and political conditions of existence are merely imprinted on the defini-
tively given individual. (Foucault 1991, 2001; Rose 1999; Bergström & Boréus 2000, 
Utaker 2000; Hall 2001a; Smart 2002) 
Foucault conceived the subjects as incapable of “… having meaningful experi-
ences, reasoning, forming beliefs, and acting outside of a particular social context”. 
(Bevir 1999a: 354) However, Bevir (1999a) argues that Foucault’s rejection of auton-
omy did not entail the rejection of agency. Foucault imagined subjects as creative 
beings, who exercise their creativity inside a distinct social context comprised of sev-
eral discursive options. These options allow us to question our present position. Oth-
erwise, we cannot explain how “Different people adopt different beliefs and perform 
different actions against the background of the same social structure, so there must be 
at least an undecided space in front of the same social structures where the individu-
als decide what beliefs to hold and what actions to perform”. (Bevir 1999b: 68) 
Foucault demanded even more from every individual. First, philosophically, Fou-
cault described liberty as the process of the constant challenge to discursive norms, 
i.e. rather than finding our position, we should create a new one (desidentification). 
(Foucault 1991, 2001; McNay 1994; Bevir 1999b) Foucault (quoted in Rabinow 
1991: 22) wrote, “Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to 
refuse what we are. … We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through refusal 
of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries”. 
Second, at the individual level, Foucault followed Nietzsche and distinguished be-
tween morality and ethics. Morality contributes premises of our behaviour, a heter-
onymous code to which we should obey out of fear or guilt. However, we could and 
should reflect about these premises, judge the possibilities, experiment and test the 
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culturally given codes and finally, develop our own ethical position. (Foucault 1991, 
2001; Rose 1999; Kendall & Wickham 1999; Bevir 1999b) Foucault (1991: 351) 
wrote, “From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one 
practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art.” 
Third, regarding the political and civil rights and freedoms, Foucault argued that, 
the individuals could exercise and guarantee their liberty only through their own ac-
tions. Foucault (1991: 245) wrote, “The liberty of men is never assured by the institu-
tions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. This is why almost all of these 
laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not because they are 
ambiguous, but simply because ‘liberty’ is what must be exercised”. 
Discourse analysts discuss in length the impact of individuals in the production of 
meaning. Foucault emphasised that meaning making is collective: everyone partici-
pates in its production process. However, Foucault confirmed the inequality of au-
thors. The discourses written by certain authors “… must be received in a certain 
mode and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status”. (Foucault 1991: 107) 
These statements have a stronger echo and can even transcend the general social 
frames of meanings. First, inequality is the result of actor‘s formal role/ position in a 
particular field of discourse. (Foucault 1991) Second, it is a function of author’s abil-
ity to formulate his representation (and consequently to establish himself as a founder 
of discursivity). (Rabinow 1991) Third, inequality is a consequence of author’s posi-
tion or symbolic capital in society. (Sand 2000; Taylor 2001a) Therefore, certain in-
dividuals have a larger audience and can participate in discourses outside of their for-
mal education/expertise/occupation. (McNay 1994; Neumann 2001) 
2.4 Discourse, power and knowledge  
Foucault conceded that the weak point of his discourse theory was “… its failure to 
incorporate a theory of power into the analysis of discourse”. (McNay 1994: 85) 
Therefore, in his latest writings, Foucault (2001) rebuilt the concept of power (and its 
social effects) and coupled it to the concept of knowledge/truth. (Bevir 1999b; Rose 
1999; Brass 2000; Wandel 2001; Smart 2002) 
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Foucault (1991: 61) defined power “… as a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body, much more than a negative instance whose function is 
repression”. First, Foucault rejected that power is an institution or an innate (physi-
cal) strength possessed by a ruling class, a bureaucratic network, or STATE. Power is 
rather an immanent strategic human relation, which runs through the entire social 
body. Power, as Foucault understood it, “… refers to all endeavours to shape, guide, 
direct the conduct of other, whether these be the crew of a ship, the members of a 
household, the employees of a boss, the children of a family or the inhabitants of a 
territory. And it also embraces the ways in which one might be urged and educated to 
bridle one’s own passions, to control one’s own instincts, to govern oneself”. (Rose 
1999: 3) Power does not operate from the top to the bottom, but it circulates between 
subjects. It has no meaning to say that someone posses power, because power is not 
possessed, but practised and exercised (Foucault 1991, 2001, 2002; Digeser 1992; 
Blain 1994; Kendall & Wickham 1999; Bergström & Boréus 2000, Neumann & Sand 
2000; Neumann 2002; Gordon 2001; Hall 2001b) 
Second, Foucault rejected that the essence of power is domination of one over an-
other. Foucault (2001: 120) wrote, “But it seems to me now that the notion of repres-
sion is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of 
power”. The essence of power was not its repressive, but rather its productive aspect. 
Power is an asset, which produces new discourses, new truths, new subjects, new 
practices, and new institutions. (Hall 2001a, 2001b; Gordon 2001; Neumann 2002; 
Foucault 2002) “What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the 
fact that it doesn’t only weight on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and pro-
duces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse…. It is not 
simply eye and ear: it makes people act and speak” (Foucault 2001: 120, 172) 
Third, discourse contains power because it establishes knowledge. Carabine (2001: 
274) writes that knowledge is a product of discourse that specifies “… what is mor-
ally, socially and legally un/acceptable at any given moment in a culture”. Discourse 
establishes norms/categories, i.e. normal, moral, practical, and legal, etc. Discursive 
norms serve both as measures, and as goals, which everyone should aim to achieve. 
Further, discourse ascertains which concrete behaviours fall inside or outside the es-
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tablished categories, and accords to them distinct moral values. We compare all hu-
man behaviours, including ours, to these discursively modelled social norms. (Rose 
1999; Mehan 2001) Finally, yet importantly, knowledge serves as base for the or-
ganisation and activity of a whole net of institutions that use knowledge to educate, 
regulate, control, and punish the deviant. (McNay 1994; Kendall & Wickham 1999; 
Neumann & Sand 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Neumann 2001; Smart 2002) 
Foucault defined the abovementioned process as normalisation. “Normalization is a 
means through which power is deployed. It is a dynamic of knowledge, practiced and 
learned, dispersed around various centres of practice and expertise.” (Carabine 2001: 
278) The unattainable goal of normalisation is homogeneity and conformity. (Fou-
cault 1991, 2001; Rabinow 1991; Utaker 2000; Hodge & Kress 2001) 
Forth, Foucault (2001) argued that knowledge and power reside in a circular rela-
tion. (Bevir 1999b; Miller & Rose 2001; Gordon 2001) Foucault (1991: 175) wrote, 
“… power and knowledge directly imply one another; … there is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relations”. Power and knowledge are inextrica-
bly enmeshed because they focus on the same human beings and their behaviour. 
(Brass 2000; Hall 2001a) Further, as Rose (1999: 7) points out, “To rule properly, it 
is necessary to rule in a light of a knowledge of the particular and specific character-
istics that are taken to be immanent to that over which rule is to be exercised”. How-
ever, Foucault never intended to equate power with knowledge. Power and knowl-
edge generate each other, but they are not the same. (Digeser 1992; Gordon 2001) 
Fifth, Foucault (quoted in McNay 1994: 89) argued that history evolves through a 
constant struggle between different power blocks, trying to impose their knowledge. 
“Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at uni-
versal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs 
each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domi-
nation.” According to Foucault, we struggle constantly aiming to alter power rela-
tions. Therefore, all power relations are inherently unstable and reversible. There are 
no permanent victories, but a permanent strife. (Mehan 2001; Rabinow 1991; Blain 
1994; McNay 1994; Kendall & Wickham 1999; Brass 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis 
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2000; Gordon 2001) Foucault (1991: 343) concluded, “… then we always have 
some-thing to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic 
activism.” 
2.5 Discourse analysis as a methodological tool 
Discourse analysis serves as a common designation for an array of research strategies 
that make use of different types of data. (Bergström & Boréus 2000; Hook 2001; 
Taylor 2001a) Therefore, the discursive approaches vary in important ways. (Potter & 
Wetherel 1987; Potter 1997; Fairclough 1995, 2000; Keenoy et al. 1997; Hammer-
sley 1997; Wetherell et al 2001b; Wodak 2002) Certain discourse researchers define 
discourse analysis as the study of language in use, reducing discursive practices to 
textuality. They concentrate their research on the study of metaphors, sentence con-
struction, etc. (Fairclough 1995, 2000; Chiapello & Fairclough 2002; Wodak 2002; 
Wetherell et al 2001a) These authors overestimate linguistic and representational 
powers of language. (McNay 1994) 
Wetherell et al (2001b: 3) define Foucauldian discourse analysis as the study of 
meaning making as revealed through discourse, i.e. how the knowledge is produced 
and revealed through discourse. First, Foucault emphasised the unity of language and 
action as sources of meaning. According to Foucault (1991: 334), meaning “… is not, 
then to be sought only in theoretical formulations such as those of philosophy or sci-
ence; it can and must be analyzed in every manner of speaking, doing, or behaving in 
which the individual appears and acts as subject of learning, as ethical or juridical 
subject, as subject conscious of himself and others”. 
Second, and this is the crucial point, “… meaning construction allows people to 
come to shared understandings (the basis of identity, ideology, frames of collective 
action, and specific discourse), and as shared understandings are crucial to alliances, 
solidarity, and mobilization, being able to explain and analyse meaning construction 
is fundamental to understanding political alliance and mobilization, as well as a host 
of other movement processes”. (Kane 2000: 313) Therefore, the goal of discourse 
analysis is to reveal the premises of meaning, how these premises are combined to 
form knowledge, to effectuate power and influence the behaviour inside the group 
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and outside it. (Foucault 1991, 2001, 2002; McNay 1994; Utaker 2000; Hall 2001a; 
Carabine 2000; Schaanning 2000; Neumann 2002; Smart 2002) 
Third, Foucault (1991) emphasised that the discourse analysis does not focus on 
the truth and its validity, but on the conditions, the discursive regime that produces 
and exercises the truth, the effects of the truth, and what was going to happen if we 
produced or exercised a different truth. (Foucault 1991, 2001; Carabine 2000; 
Schaanning 2000; Neumann 2002; Smart 2002) Wetherell (2001a: 16) explains, “In 
discourse research, decisions about the truth and falsity of descriptions are typically 
suspended. Discourse analysts are more interested in studying the process of con-
struction itself, how ‘truths’ emerge, how social realities and identities are built and 
the consequences of these, than working out what ‘really happened’”. 
Forth, Foucault (1991, 2001) rejected the assumption of a telos built into history. 
The events have no predetermined substance and do not represent a piece of a general 
design or purpose. The events that shape social history are discontinuous, divergent, 
and governed by chance. (McNay 1994) Therefore, Miller & Rose (2001: 364-365) 
write, “Rather than searching for causes and determinants, we need to try to identify 
the ways in which diverse arrays of events- institutional, technical, political, moral- 
are articulated together to provide a set of conditions which make changes of this 
type possible, and the heterogeneous powers and capacities which have been called 
into play in these new ways of thinking and acting”. 
Fifth, Foucault (1991: 247, 254) wrote, “Nothing is fundamental. That is what is 
interesting in the analysis of society … there are only reciprocal relations… What is 
interesting is always interconnection, not the primacy of this over that, which never 
has any meaning”. Hence, Foucault rejected the study of social life through causal 
models expressed in the form of independent and dependent variables. (Neumann 
2001) The researcher should study society as a totality, analysing any particular phe-
nomenon against the background of its wider social context. (Mathisen 1997; Bevir 
1999a, 1999b; Neumann 2001; Wandel 2001) 
Discourse analysts study meaning making through four research strategies. First, 
they search to identify the competing discursive formations of reality. In this strategy, 
we concentrate our research in identifying how the participants in discourse combine 
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the truths to built competing pictures of reality. Second, we search for the scarcity of 
meaning, i.e. taboos, unsaid, impossible, or unreasonable ideas. In this case, we look 
for missing truths, in one or some of the discursive positions. Third, different mean-
ings (or scarcity of meaning) have histories developed through the lives of the par-
ticipants in discourse. In this case, we aim to identify these histories and show how 
they developed (produced) different discursive positions. Forth, discourse analysts 
study changes in the dominance of certain discourses and the development of new 
discourses. Each concrete discourse analysis uses one of these techniques or a combi-
nation of them. (Foucault 1991; McNay 1994; Kendall & Wickham 1999; Hook 
2001; Hollway 2001) 
2.6 Metatheoretical characteristics of discourse analysis 
Discourse analysts assert that knowledge obtained through discourse analysis has 
three metatheoretical characteristics. The first one relates to our ontological under-
standing of reality. There is no ONE reality. There are challenging realities built by 
their corresponding bodies of knowledge. (Taylor 2001a; Wetherell 2001c; Smart 
2002) 
Second, epistemologically, knowledge is partial, situated, and contingent i.e. it 
does not represent a universal knowledge, but it is specific to the place/time/situation 
that we study. (Agger 1991) Discourse analysis does not predict or dictate the future, 
but it draws our attention to the complexity of the social world, the possibilities, the 
incidence off the unexpected, and the contingence of the present. The mixture of fac-
tors would not necessarily be the same in another situation in the future. (Rose 1999; 
Taylor 2001a) Therefore, the best we can do is to predict possible (alternative) situa-
tions. 
Third, knowledge is relative/reflexive, i.e. the research results depend on the re-
searchers’ worldview and value system. Foucault (2001) stated that the belief in so-
cial research as detached, historical, truth-seeking process is unsustainable. (Hall 
2001b; Taylor 2001a; Wetherell 2001c; Smart 2002) Atkinson (quoted in Taylor 
2001b: 319) writes, “The notion of reflexivity recognises that texts do not simply and 
transparently report an independent order of reality. Rather, the texts themselves are 
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implicated in the work of reality-construction”. History becomes a battle between 
different representations/ narratives. Therefore, for Foucault (2001), the goal of the 
intellectuals was not to free science from ideology, but rather to ascertain new politics 
of truth through the critical study of the society. 
However, these qualifications do not represent signs of weaknesses, but limitations 
of any research programme. “Rather, all knowledge is considered to be situated, con-
tingent and partial. Truth is unattainable because reality itself is not single or static, 
and reality is also inevitably influenced and altered by any processes through which a 
researcher attempts to investigate and represent it.” (Taylor 2001b: 319) 
What is the value of discourse analysis? Why should we engage in such study? 
First, all instances of language-use are rhetorical. As such, to study discourse means 
to investigate the positions and arguments pro and against in a certain issue. No one 
can participate in discourse without knowing the opponent. (Taylor 2001a) 
Second, the discourse analysis does more than explain the historical preconditions, 
which make the present appear as its does. (Foucault 1991; Neumann 2002) “The 
particular aim of a genealogical study is to explore how meanings and practices have 
operated in the past, without making predictions for the future. However, it is also 
clear that discourses do not just disappear or stop functioning, so ultimately the inter-
est of such analysis is in its recognizable relevance to present-day situations and ma-
terial, like contemporary policy texts.” (Taylor 2001b: 317) 
2.7 Criteria for evaluation 
In the positivist/post-positivist tradition, research is evaluated according to four crite-
ria. The first criterion is construct validity- the quality of the operational measure-
ment of the concept being studied. To achieve high construct validity, the measure-
ment apparatus should work consistently. In this case, the researcher speaks of inter-
reliability. The second criterion is internal validity, which refers to the accuracy of 
the results in the situation that we study. The third criterion, external validity, refers 
to the accuracy/possibility of generalising the results from the research group to the 
population. The forth criterion, reliability, demands that another researcher can repeat 
the research and arrive at the same or similar result as the original one. (Yin 1993) 
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However, the abovementioned criteria neither fit nor apply to discourse analysis. 
Seale (quoted in Taylor 2001b: 319) writes, “… conceptions of reliability and repli-
cability … are rooted in a realist view of a single external reality knowable through 
language”. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate a new set of criteria to evaluate the 
quality of discourse analysis. (Carabine 2001; Taylor 2001a) 
Taylor (2001b) stipulates the quality criteria relevant to discourse analysis. First, 
the research should relate to previously published works, whether of theory or analy-
sis, building on or challenging the claims of other researchers. (Brass 2000) The theo-
retical part of this essay rests on a thorough elaborated theory. Regarding the empiri-
cal part of the essay, the author was unable to find discursive analysis of the Albanian 
political discourse. 
Second, the research should be coherent, i.e. it should depend for its persuasive-
ness on arguments rather than emotional impact. The analysis and its conclusions 
should be logically convincing. The analysis in this essay is made as explicit/clear as 
possible in order to allow the reader to evaluate the degree of coherence. 
Third, the analysis must represent a systematic investigation (or rigour). We can 
achieve rigour by including deviant cases, finding and analysing discursive inconsis-
tencies and diversities. Foucault (quoted in Neumann 2001: 54) advised “… to read 
everything, study everything”. Expanding the scope of discursive material insures us 
that no representation is left out. (Brass 2000) This essay includes three discursive 
formations (meaning entities) that act as deviant cases to each other. The ideal case- 
including all the discourse formations- is impossible. The strict essay-guidelines lim-
ited the investigation to the most important discursive formations and contributors 
inside each formation. Other strategies inspiring to achieve thoroughness include 
more details in the research and simultaneously aiming to make the analysis as ex-
plicit as possible. The essay uses a large number of discursive materials in order to 
reveal details and reduce the possibility of omitting meaning-nuances. 
Forth, the quality of interpretation depends on special cultural qualifications. Dis-
course analysis demands from the researcher a high degree of cultural competence. 
First, the researcher should know the available texts and how to retrieve these. Sec-
ond, the researcher must understand the cultural elements of language and be able to 
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spot even subtle aspects. (Taylor 2001a; Carabine 2001) The author considers himself 
able to understand the underlying cultural codes that serve as building bricks for the 
meanings formulated by Albanian political leaders. 
Fifth, the data used in the essay should be relevant to the topic of essay. The data 
used in this essay contain all the necessary discursive material to achieve the goal 
stipulated in chapter 1. The data written by the leaders themselves is the best source 
to trace the political decisions, their rationalisation, their premises, and how they 
were connected together. 
Sixth, the paper should be useful and relevant for those interested about the Yugo-
slav conflict. This attribute of the essay was discussed already in the sub-chapter 1.2. 
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3. METHOD 
3.1 Method- the case study research design 
Method refers to the specific techniques of scientific research such as observation, 
interviews, questionnaires, etc. Method is a necessary part of the research design. 
Hellevik (1994: 4) defines method as “… a line of action, an instrument to resolve 
problems and to arrive at new knowledge. Any instrument that serves this purpose is 
part of the arsenal of methods.” 
Yin (1993, 1994) writes that the choice of the method depends on: 1. The type of 
research question we have formulated. 2. The degree of control we have over the ac-
tual behavioural events. 3. The degree of focus, the author has on contemporary as 
opposed to historic events. First, the essay describes (explains) a concrete example of 
human agency, i.e. how the political leaders constructed reality. Second, the re-
searcher has no control over the behaviour of the subjects and cannot manipulate it as 
in a psychological experiment. Third, the phenomenon is a contemporary one allow-
ing the use of a full variety of evidence (data), like interviews, observation, graphic 
materials, etc. The answers make it clear that the study of a contemporary political 
discourse is compatible with one empirical method: the case study research design. It 
is impossible to apply it together with experiments, surveys, histories, or analysis of 
archival information. 
Yin (1994/2003: 13-14) defines the case study as a comprehensive research strat-
egy that: n Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, es-
pecially when, o The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident, 
p Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there may be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result, q relies on multiple sources 
of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and conse-
quently, r benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analysis. 
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The main feature of case studies is that they are holistic- they treat cases as whole 
entities and not as collections of parts (or collections of scores on variables). Further, 
case studies allow us to study the phenomenon in its context. These features represent 
a liability for other methodological approaches because they complicate the formula-
tion of causal models. (Yin 1993) On the contrary, they strengthen discourse analysis 
as research design. Discourse analysis does not deal with limited independent/ de-
pendent variables, but with an entity of interconnected narratives and their context. 
Further, discourse analysis uses multiple sources from written data to symbols or be-
haviour. (Carabine 2001; Neumann 2001) 
3.2 The case- the unit of analysis 
First, the essay studies a particular dossier inside Albanian discourse. Foucault 
(quoted in Ho & Tsang 2000: 136) explains a dossier as “… a case, an affair, an event 
that provided the intersection of discourses that differed in origin, form, organization, 
and function. … All of them speak, or appear to be speaking, of one and the same 
thing; … But in their totality and their variety they form neither a composite work nor 
an exemplary text, but rather a strange contest, a confrontation, a power relation, a 
battle among discourses and through discourses”. The case is that part of the Alba-
nian discourse that formed the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs. 
Second, discourses do not act separated of each other, but they form clusters of 
meanings. Hall (2001a: 73) writes, “… whenever these discursive events ‘refer to the 
same object, share the same style and … support a strategy … a common institu-
tional, administrative or political drift and pattern’, then they are said by Foucault to 
belong to the same discursive formation”. Therefore, the essay does not deal with a 
discursive nebula, but rather with discursive formations that competed about the dos-
sier: the political future of Kosovo. This organisation of research facilitates the com-
parison of different representations. 
Third, the essay does not cover every discourse, discursive formation, or individual 
in dossier. Instead, the essay deals with the most important discursive formations and 
the most important representatives inside each discursive formation. The studied dis-
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cursive formations do not represent a statistical sample of discourses, but rather the 
most prevalent discourses (as I perceive those) between the Albanians. 
Forth, the essay studies the discourse as a process because “Conflict is a process, 
not a state. Disputes have beginnings, middles, and, occasionally, ends, or at least 
resting places”. (Brenneis 1996: 43) This approach allows us to study the phenome-
non as an ongoing interaction process tracing the discursive changes. (Kendall & 
Wickham 1999; Brass 2000; Neumann 2001; Carabine 2001; Taylor 2001a) 
Fifth, the research approach adopted in this paper, studies the discourse at elite 
level, i.e. what the leaders said and how they made their case. A limitation of this pa-
per is that vox populi remains unheard and unstudied. However, the research includes 
several discursive formations at elite level, balancing fairly well this limitation. 
Sixth, the essay deals with the period 1990-1999. The time-scale for data collection 
includes in the corpus analysis even few discursive materials form the period 1988-
1989. They serve to reveal the cognitive break from the latent phase to the open con-
flict between the Albanians and the Serbs. 
3.3 The subjects 
The essay concentrates on three discursive formations: civil disobedience formation, 
the democratic formation, and the radical formation. These three discursive forma-
tions give a representative picture of the dossier about the political status of Kosovo 
and the means to achieve it. The first discursive formation is that of the civil disobe-
dience. The discourse material used to study this formation originates from the main 
leaders of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK): Ibrahim Rugova (party leader 
and President of Republic of Kosovo/died in 2006), Fehmi Agani, (deputy leader and 
chief negotiator, killed by Yugoslav police/army in 1999) and Gazmend Zajmi (party 
secretary, died in 1994). A few other texts, written by the other members of LDK, are 
used also. 
Shkëlzen Maliqi, Veton Surroi, and Muhamet Kullashi represent the democratic 
discursive formation. They were the initiators of the Association of Philosophers and 
Sociologists, the first organisation outside the system of League of Communist of 
Yugoslavia. Latter they led the Kosovo branch of the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative 
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(UJDI), the Social-Democratic Party of Kosovo, and the Youth Parliament of Kosovo 
(latter named the Parliamentarian Party of Kosovo). Surroi retreated from politics in 
period 1991-1993 and worked as journalist for BBC. He participated in the Ram-
bouillet talks as independent. Maliqi resigned from the leadership of Parliamentarian 
Party of Kosovo, but continued to write as commentator for many newspapers. Kul-
lashi was highly active in the beginning, but he left Kosovo in 1992 for France. 
Rexhep Qosja represents the radical option. Qosja was the director of the Al-
banological Institute. After 1991, Qosja led the independent intellectuals, an informal 
opposition group to LDK. Qosja represented the group and he produced a huge 
amount of discursive materials. Qosja authored a number of important articles for 
Zëri i Kosovës (Voice of Kosova), the newspaper of the Zurich-based Popular Move-
ment of Kosovo. The Popular Movement of Kosovo was the force behind the Kosovo 
Liberation Army. In 1998, Qosja organised the Albanian Democratic Union, a loose 
group of intellectuals and former LDK members. He was one of the two candidates 
for the duty of spokesperson for Kosovo Liberation Army. Qosja participated in the 
talks in Rambouillet as the leader of the Albanian Democratic Union. 
3.4 Collecting discursive data/materials 
The discourse analysis relies on a multiple sources of evidences. Foucault (1991: 76-
77) wrote that discourse analysis, “… requires patience and a knowledge of details, 
and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material”. Ho & Tsang (2000), Cara-
bine (2001), etc, write that discourse analysis demands an inclusive approach to data 
collection. If we study, for example, nationalism, than we should expect to find ob-
servable data of national discourse in texts like school books, historical essays, po-
etry; in social practices like education, military service, religious practices; institu-
tions like schools/ university, TV; informal institutions like informal networks of 
alumni, soldiers etc. (Hook 2001; Neumann 2001) 
Data used in discourse analysis, includes documents, interviews, observations, and 
physical artefacts. With physical artefacts, we mean non-text artefacts like posters, 
pictures etc. In an ideal research, we should make use of all these sources of evi-
dence. However, Foucault underlined the advantages of language (Saussure used the 
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notion parole, while Chomsky uses the notion performance), especially written lan-
guage. First, writing is the most important technology that we use to reveal our 
meaning. Second, texts/writings have a fixed source and supply a broad audience 
with readymade meanings. (Neumann 2002) Third, the strength of documents is that 
they are stable, exact, unobtrusive, and provide a broad coverage of the object. 
Data used in this essay consists of written documents only (interviews, articles, 
books, press releases, etc). This study takes a multi-perspective approach covering 
both documents written for the Albanian press and the foreign media. The transla-
tions from Albanian to English are of mine. 
The Albanian leaders were not interviewed for three reasons. First, Zajmi and 
Agani, two of the main text contributors, passed away. Second, it was impossible to 
interview the subjects during the research period. This changed after 1999, but by 
then, the context had changed radically allowing a change of representations. The 
goal was to study how meaning evolved during the period 1990-1999 rather than af-
ter 1999. Third, many discourse analysts resists the idea of conducting interviews. 
They fear that the researcher’s questions can mask the real discourse. (Taylor 2001a) 
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4. THE ALBANIAN CONTEXT 
The New York Times published in November 1990 a CIA analysis, which predicted 
that war was going to break out in Yugoslavia within an 18 months period. The war 
did break up, but not in Kosovo, Yugoslavia’s powder keg. (Neier 1994; Judah 1997; 
Vickers 1998; Motes 1999; Malcolm 1998) The historical events (1989-1990) pro-
duced radical changes in the Albanian leadership. New leaders addressed the national 
question with a new world understanding and strategy. A short retrospective journey 
is necessary to realise the political background of the new political leaders and 
groups. 
4.1 The predecessors of the Albanian national movement 
Three political groups dominated the Albanian political scene during the period 
1945-1989. The oldest force consisted of the remnants of the pre-WWII elite: a mix 
of monarchical, nationalist, and anti-Communist elements. The most important frac-
tion was the Albanian National-Democratic Organisation created during the WWII. 
The Organisation fought unsuccessfully the Yugoslav partisan army. After 1945, the 
Organisation acted in co-operation with the Albanian émigré organisations, Balli 
Kombëtar (National Front), Legaliteti (Legality), and the Western intelligence ser-
vices. Its influence in Kosovo fizzled out due to two reasons. First, UDB-a (the 
Yugoslav Secret Service) arrested its main leaders in 1947. Second, the Organisation 
lost its Western support after the rapprochement between the West and Yugoslavia in 
1948. 
The second political force was the hierarchy of League of Communist of Yugosla-
via (hereafter LCY). It included party officials and high civil servants, i.e. the provin-
cial power bearing elite. Its top stratum, commonly known as ‘the clan of Gjakova’4, 
was a tight group of individuals connected by their political activity/position and 
through family and friendship ties. They were former members of the Communist 
Party of Albania, sent to Kosovo to help the organisation of the Communist resis-
tance there. The provincial LCY leadership exercised tight control over the appoint-
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ments and political decisions. As the number of civil servants and graduated profes-
sionals expanded, nepotism was enhanced with cronyism. 
The Albanian Communist leaders intended to create the Republic of Kosovo, but 
slowly, careful not to infuriate Tito. The Albanian leadership acted through party and 
bureaucratic channels. The limits and the possibilities to do so were situational and 
poorly defined. Nevertheless, the Titists were considered a benign opposition. While 
the other Republican leaderships tried to diminish the power of the Federate, the Al-
banian leaders tried to cut the ties with Serbia by rallying the help of Federative insti-
tutions. The 1981 grassroots demonstrations showed that the Albanian communist 
leaders were loosing their control over the Albanians. The demonstrations put the 
Albanian leadership in an impossible position between the Albanians and the Federa-
tive institutions. 
The pre-World War II Albanian intelligentsia left Kosovo or it was wiped out. Ini-
tially, the new stratum of Albanian intellectuals grew slowly. The process accelerated 
only after 1966 and especially after the opening in 1969 of the University of 
Prishtina. The Albanian intellectuals (the majority employed at the University of 
Prishtina) served as an appendix to the provincial LCY leadership. Their dissonance 
to the conditions in Kosovo followed the lines drawn by the provincial LCY leader-
ship. They developed slowly their own Aesop-a-like language to criticise the Yugo-
slav system or evoke the Albanian history and nationalism. However, they never tried 
to turn the popular respect into political power or play any such role. Their struggle 
consisted of long deliberations in coffeehouses close to University campus. 
The third political formation consisted of Marxist-Leninist cells, politically orien-
tated towards Enver Hoxha and Albania. (Judah 2000b) Adem Demaçi created the 
first group, the Revolutionary Movement for the Unification of the Albanians, in 
1961. Demaçi wrote the statute of the movement emphasising that the goal was lib-
eration and unification5. His statute served as a model for the Popular Red Front cre-
ated in 1980 in Germany by the Gërvalla brothers. The third group was the Group of 
Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo leaded by Kadri Zeka and based in Switzerland. After 
1982, the groups tried to co-operate with each other. They held a secret meeting in 
Istanbul in the presence of an Albanian diplomat, but failed to reach an agreement6. 
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The radicals managed to preserve the spirit of national resistance and the idea of 
unification with Albania. (Demaçi 1990) The radicals blamed the colonial-
ist/imperialist policy of the Great Powers for the annexation of Kosovo and the Serb 
occupation and capitalism for producing political oppression, social inequality, and 
economic backwardness. The prerequisites for the development of Kosovo were in-
dependence, the creation of united Albania, and Communism as leading ideology. 
(Vickers 1998; Judah 2000a) The Marxists were convinced that the unification with 
Albania was impossible. Shatri, an aide to Gërvalla brothers said, “No one thought 
Yugoslavia could be destroyed … it was the ‘West’s little darling’”. (Judah 2000a: 
105) Therefore, all the groups opted for a more practical, short-term goal, the Alba-
nian republic in Yugoslavia. It was the first step as the groups waited for a better time 
for the unification idea. (Lalaj 2000) 
Regarding the means to achieve the goals, Demaçi wrote, “Our movement … shall 
use all the methods and means that it posses, from those political-propaganda- peace-
ful means to armed struggle and popular general uprising- non-peaceful means”. (Ar-
ticle 2) Gërvalla supported the strategy of guerra prolongata popolare. He foresaw 
three phases of resistance. The first phase consisted of increasing the ideological and 
political conscience of masses. During the phase two, the movement would use any 
peaceful means such as strikes, demonstrations, protests etc. The third phase was the 
armed struggle to achieve unification. (Lalaj 2000) On January 17, 1982, the Serb 
Secret Service assassinated the brothers Gërvalla and Kadri Zeka. The assassinations 
and the repression that followed the 1981 demonstrations convinced the leaders of the 
Movement that war was unavoidable. It was simply a matter of time. (Judah 200b) 
In February-March 1982, the Albanian groups came to an agreement and created 
The Movement for the Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia, commonly known as the 
Movement. The Movement adopted the political platform of the Front of Republic of 
Kosovo developed by Kadri Zeka and Hydajet Hyseni. The fall of Communism re-
vived the discussion about the ideology and the tactics of the Movement. In the Sec-
ond Meeting of the Movement, the moderates left the Movement that now operated 
under the name Lëvizja Popullore për Republikën e Kosovës (Popular Movement for 
the Republic of Kosovo-LPRK). Only 2 years latter (1992), a more moder-
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ate/pragmatic group of leaders replaced the radicals. The Movement operated now 
under the name Popular Movement of Kosovo, abbreviated as LPK. Without de-
nouncing explicitly the Communist past, they tried to reform the Movement from a 
political/ideological sectarian group to a pro-democratic national-liberation front. 
4.2 The events that preceded the Albanian national movement 
In March 1981, the students of University of Prishtina organised the first demonstra-
tion demanding better living conditions. Only days latter, the demonstrations turned 
political and the participants demanded the status of republic. The provincial leader-
ship predominantly Albanian labelled the demonstrations as “counter-revolutionary” 
(Hasani 1981: 22) and acted to quell those by massive use of police violence fol-
lowed by political trials7,  ‘differentiation’8, and an even more exigent application of 
the criterion of ‘political-moral suitability’ introduced in 1973. 
However, there was the activity of the Serbian intellectuals that culminated in the 
Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Sciences, which terrified the Albanian intel-
lectuals. The Memorandum9 came along with a wave of letters, petitions, meetings 
and gatherings of Serbs intellectuals and/or Serbs from Kosovo. On 24 April 1987, 
Milošević organised the first demonstration of the Serbs in Kosovo. The police, pre-
dominantly Albanian, intervened brutally and Milošević approached to the already 
agitated Serbs with the phrase “No one is allowed to beat you!”10 That phrase made 
him the undisputed leader for almost 10 years. (Magaš 1993; Silber & Little 1995; 
Miller 1997; Malcolm 1998; Vickers 1998; Meier 1999; Motes 1999; Mønnesland 
1999; Thomas 1999; Judah 2000a; Dragović-Soso 2002; Kostovicova 2000; To-
dorova 2000) 
In July 1988, Milošević organised the Serbs in Kosovo and used them as shock 
troops in the ‘happenings of the people’.11 On 19 November 1988, the Albanian lead-
ers admitted the constitutional changes under pressure from Belgrade and continuous 
Serb demonstrations. Until that moment, they hoped to appease Milošević with some 
personal/decorative/rhetoric changes. They expected help from the Federative institu-
tions, but these were blocked and ‘Yugoslavism’ and ‘balance of power’ had become 
outdated. Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia were trying to change unilaterally the organis-
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ing formula. (Shala 1990; Judah 1997, 2000a, 2000b; Miller 1997; Vickers 1998, 
2000; Motes 1999; Meier 1999; Malcolm 1998; Lubonja 2000; Mazower 2001) 
The Albanian answer came too late. Only on 24 January 1989, the Albanians or-
ganised their first demonstrations. Milošević reacted immediately. On 24 February, 
the Serb parliament adopted the constitutional changes. Facing huge demonstrations 
and hunger strikes in Kosovo, Milošević forced the collective Yugoslav presidency to 
declare the state of emergence (27 February) and arrested Azem Vllasi12 (2 March). 
On 24 March 1989, the Kosovo Assembly approved the constitutional changes rec-
ognising de jure the abolition of autonomy. Only 10 MPs dared to vote against the 
changes. 1,500 extra officers from the All Yugoslav Special Police, 15,000 soldiers, 
and rumours about detention lists did the trick. Small clashes between Serb police 
and Albanians continued during all 1989. The detention of 237 Albanian intellectuals 
and the threat to detain another 300 paralysed the Albanian elite. The Albanian elite 
remained in limbo until the legalisation of political pluralism in Serbia. (Malcolm 
1998; Silber & Little 1995; Thomas 1999; Judah 1997, 2000a; Motes 1999; Vickers 
1998, 2000; Meier 1999) 
4.3 A new leadership takes over 
The abolition of autonomy and the political changes in Eastern Europe had a great 
impact on the further organisation of the Albanian movement. (Gjeloshi 1992) First, 
in the other Yugoslav republics, the Communist elite remained intact and leaded the 
transition to democracy and independence. The state institutions were preserved and 
used to achieve independence. The Albanians leaders, on the other side, failed to re-
sists to Milošević’s salami tactic. Milošević discredited and purged them one after 
the other destroying in process the institutional structures in Kosovo. 
Second, the Marxists were the organisers of the demonstrations in 1989. However, 
they failed to keep the momentum. They were experiencing an identity crisis as the 
Communist regime in Albania was collapsing. The Albanians in Kosovo were disap-
pointed with the reality of Albania. All the other Albanian political parties (as LCY in 
Kosovo did before it scattered) blamed the 1981 demonstrations for provoking the 
1981-1989 repression. They depicted the Marxists as imprudent, tactically reckless 
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and hasty, and ideologically opposed by USA and Europe. Generally, the Marxists 
were popular and considered trustworthy as individuals, but not suitable as political 
leaders. 
Third, the new class of leaders came out the Albanian intelligentsia. The new lead-
ers were highly motivated and the majority of them as university lecturers enjoyed 
the respect of the Albanians. However, they lacked political and organisational ex-
perience. It was the first time they dared to take over a political role and stand against 
Milošević. Further, their political activity suffered from egotistic interdivisions. 
4.4 The formation of the Albanian national movement 
Two institutions played an important role in the political organisation of the Albanian 
elite after the abolition of autonomy. The first one was the Writers’ Association of 
Kosovo. The Albanian members of the Association proclaimed in April 1988 the first 
national programme. The second group was the Association of Philosophers and So-
ciologists of Kosovo (APHSK)13. The APHSK organised a number of manifestation, 
petitions, gathering etc. The Associations were an intermediary organisation phase 
until the new parties were legalised. (Maliqi 1998b; Malcolm 1998; The Kosovo Re-
port 2000) 
On December 7, 1989, members of APHSK founded the Prishtina Branch of the 
Union for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI). UJDI was the last effort to pre-
serve Yugoslavia as a united and democratic country, either as a federate or as a con-
federate. Its initiators propagated that there were more reasons to stay together than to 
dismember Yugoslavia. The Union promoted a combination of sovereignty of citi-
zens-individuals and republics and tried to find a new formula for the federation. 
Probably more important than their political goals there was their political strategy. 
The UJDI called for the solution of the problems through democratic means, bilateral 
and multilateral talks and not through unilateral actions. (Maliqi 1998b; Malcolm 
1998) 
The Democratic League of Kosova14 was founded on 23 December 1989 as the na-
tional party of the Albanians in Yugoslavia. As the dissolution of Yugoslavia pro-
ceeded rapidly, the LDK lost its all-Yugoslav feature and it was re-conceptualised as 
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the party of the Albanians in Kosovo. The Albanians in Macedonia decided to found 
their own political party, the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP). 
LDK copied the organisation of LCY. It created a number of mass organisations 
(youth, women etc) in order to unite all the Albanians in Kosovo. “Both DLK and 
PDP were based on the model of dominant national parties, like those first estab-
lished in Slovenia and Croatia and later in the other parts of former Yugoslavia, in-
cluding Bosnia, where the “pluralist” space at the very beginning was divided on an 
ethnic base.” (Maliqi 1998b: 223) At the same time, the LCY disintegrated and whole 
LCY cells joined LDK. LDK declared that its goals were democracy, federal Yugo-
slavia, the rule of law and political pluralism. The main goal was certainly the prob-
lem of the status of Kosovo. In May 1990, the Academy of Sciences and Arts of 
Kosovo represented its Declaration, which served to legitimise the actions of LDK. 
The Declaration called for Kosovo as “independent and equal subject in Yugoslavia”. 
The other political parties were created shortly after LDK15. There were no ideo-
logical differences, but rather personal divergences between their leaders. Neverthe-
less, LDK was very effective in the first months of its existence and caught the main 
part of the Albanians. (Maliqi 1998b) Under pressure from the other political parties, 
LDK agreed to create the Democratic Forum of Kosovo on 1 July 1990 as a co-
ordination instrument for the Albanian movement. On 28.08.1991, the Albanian po-
litical parties created a new council gathering all the Albanian parties in the former 
Yugoslavia. (Gjeloshi 1992) The Forum declared that its main goal was to establish 
“the sovereignty of Kosova as a constitutive entity of the Yugoslav community in 
equal terms with its other entities”. 
The members of the Assembly of Kosova, elected in 1989, switched their loyalty 
from LCY to LDK. On 2 July 1990, 115 Albanian members of the parliament issued 
a Political Declaration, proclaiming the Republic of Kosova and its equality to all the 
other Yugoslav republics. The Declaration did not have the power of law and it was 
not legally binding. However, on 26 June 1990, the Serbian Assembly had voted al-
ready to suspend the Assembly of Kosova. On 5 July 1990, the Albanian members of 
the Assembly voted for the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. On 7 September 
1990, they met again and approved the new constitution declaring Kosovo a republic 
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within the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The declaration and the respective 
Constitutional changes were one of many unilateral legal actions undertaken by dif-
ferent Yugoslav units after the Federation ceased to function. (Judah 2000a; von Kohl 
& Libal 1992; Maliqi 1998b; Surroi 1998a; Troebst 1998) 
From 26 to 30 September 1991 the Albanians (87.01% of the voters) voted in a 
referendum and endorsed their constitution (99.87% pro). On 19 October 1991, the 
Parliament met and declared Kosova ‘a sovereign and independent state’. On 23 De-
cember 1991, the Government of Kosova applied unsuccessfully to USA and EU for 
recognition. The parliament of the Republic of Albania recognised the independence 
of Kosova; however, the Albanian government did not follow the declaration. 
(Troebst 1998) 
In May 1992, the Albanians went to polls to elect their new parliament, the first 
since the declaration of independence. The new parliament had 143 seats and Democ-
ratic League of Kosova leaded by Rugova won 96 of these. Rugova became the first 
president of the Republic of Kosova. (Simic 1998; Troebst 1998) 
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5. “NO ‘SPECIAL STATUS’, NO THIRD REPUBLIC, 
BUT ONLY INDEPENDENCE!”16 
5.1 Rugova and his self-image 
Mehmet Kraja, Jusuf Buxhovi, Fehmi Agani, etc were planning the foundation of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). However, they could not agree about the 
leader of the party and decided to co-opt someone outside their ranks. They asked 
first Rexhep Qosja, but he refused to lead the party. Then, they offered the job to 
Rugova, who had just published a ‘strong’ article in Der Spiegel. Rugova accepted 
immediately and since that day, he became the undisputed leader of the LDK. 
Rugova grew up in an anti-Communist peasant family that had suffered a lot in the 
period immediately after the WWII. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 153) never 
forgot the Serb/Communist massacres in 1945. “The eliminations were systematic, 
they were liquidated, killed or imprisoned, all the important and well-known people 
in Kosovo. My grandfather was killed, my father was killed”17. Nevertheless, Rugova 
attended the Prishtina branch of the University of Belgrade, and during that time, be-
sides his studies, he edited the student newspaper and joined the League of Commu-
nists of Yugoslavia. Latter he worked as a researcher at the Albanological Institute, 
editor of its scientific journal, and president of the Writers Association of Kosovo. 
Rugova (1994b) represented himself as the successful researcher that was com-
pelled by the political circumstances to participate in politics and lead the largest Al-
banian political party in Kosovo. “I entered [politics] to defend, to do something, to 
create the proper conditions so the nation could develop, not to do political career.” 
(Allain & Galmiche 1994: 206) Rugova declared that the political circumstances 
were the forceful constitutional changes that abrogated the autonomy of Kosovo. “On 
Mars 23, 1989, I reacted and said ‘I do not accept this, I cannot accept this’”. (Allain 
& Galmiche 1994: 124) Rugova claimed that he was sacrificing himself for the nation 
facing every day the peril of being killed by the Serb police. Rugova (Allain & Gal-
miche 1994: 54) declared, “Probably, they are saving me for the end… to provoke 
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even more the Albanians… I have taken the danger upon myself”. To the foreign me-
dia and diplomats, Rugova repeated that he possessed a modern philosophy after one 
year at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales attending the lectures of 
Roland Barthes. Rugova claimed that his political philosophy was inspired by exis-
tentialism and reflected the best Albanian values. 
5.2 The Albanians- repressed, discriminated and threatened 
by Milošević and Serbia 
The discourse of the leaders of the LDK18 concentrated on the position of the Albani-
ans in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. (Rugova 1989a, 1990e; Agani 1994a; Cana 1990b) 
The LDK leaders declared that the Albanians were experiencing an unparalleled cam-
paign of political and judicial repression. The repression that began immediately after 
the 1981 demonstrations was intensified after Milošević became the leader of the 
League of Communists of Serbia. Rugova (1990c: 131) wrote, “The present situation 
in Kosovo is the outcome of nine years of repression and anti-democratic policy, 
which has reached its culmination in the present extremist Serbian policy that gives 
prominence to ‘territory, volunteers, and weapons’”. 
The LDK leaders described the Albanians as socially and politically discriminated 
by the Serb minority, which enjoyed preferential treatment regarding employment 
and housing. (Rugova 1989a; Allain & Galmiche 1994, Agani 1994a) The Albanian 
graduates felt especially discriminated. Their Serb counterparts treated them con-
temptuously as quasi-intellectuals, less qualified and with dubious scientific creden-
tials. Rugova (1989b: 192) retorted, “Of course, we do not have a tradition of a uni-
versity like that of Belgrade or Zagreb, but what they [Serbs] say about its [Univer-
sity of Prishtina] quality is debatable”. 
Further, the LDK leaders described the Albanian nation as the poorest in Yugosla-
via. (Rugova 1988, 1989b, 1990c; Zajmi 1991) Agani (1994a: 86, 200) wrote, “Kos-
ova is economically backward, socially undeveloped … with the highest unemploy-
ment level and the lowest incomes… In comparison with the other regions, living is 
more difficult in Kosova. …poverty and unemployment, first of all, are for the Alba-
nians, the Muslims, and the Roma”. 
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However, the LDK leaders drew primarily the attention of the Albanian public to 
the situation created in Kosovo because of the “… hegemonistic, unitary, militaristic 
policy of Serbia and its leadership guided by Milosevic”. (DAPPK 1990) The LDK 
leaders declared that the constitutional changes and the anti-Albanian propaganda 
posed a great threat to the Albanians. They declared that the autonomy of Kosovo 
was the only institutional guarantee to their national rights. (Rugova 1989a, 1989b; 
Agani 1989a, 1992a, 1994a; Buxhovi 1989; Aliu 1989; Zajmi 1993a, 1993c) The 
LDK leaders argued that the constitutional changes and the anti-Albanian propaganda 
were not random actions, but they were part of a conscious anti-Albanian strategy 
conceived by Milošević and his aides. “The policy against the Albanians in Kosova is 
pursued in a conscious manner; so we are practically confronted with compulsory 
ghettoism”. (Rugova 1989c: 360) 
The LDK leaders continually reinforced the representation of Milošević as an exis-
tential threat to the Albanian nation. (Rugova 1989a, 1989b, 1990c; Agani 1994a; 
Cana 1989; Buxhovi 1989) Rugova warned that Milošević was reviving Ranković19 
and Čubrilović20, implying that Milošević had the same goal: to expulse the Albani-
ans. Rugova (1989c: 360, 1988: 126) wrote, “This reminds me of some of Vasa Ču-
brilović’s previous ideas… The anti-Albanian strategy of the Serbian bourgeoisie of 
the end of last century and the beginning of this century has been enriched with new 
elements according to the new conditions”. “When Ranković lost Tito’s support in 
1966 and Ranković’s Serbian followers were removed, they threatened that one day 
they would return and take revenge. This is what is happening now”. (Rugova 
(1989a) Cana (1989: 176) argued, “Now, the battle for its [Kosovo’s] complete de-
Albanianisation is beginning”. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 82-83) declared, 
“[we] …began to understand that behind all this [the constitutional changes] hung the 
threat against our very existence”. 
5.3 Ethnic conflict as elite manipulation 
The LDK leaders continued to pursue the official Yugoslav discourse. They rejected 
nationalism as ideology and denied the Serb claim that they and/or the Albanians 
were nationalists. Agani (1994a: 113) defined nationalism as the deification of the 
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nation and its national interests to the detriment of the natural rights of the other na-
tions, and condemned it as a form of national fascism. “Today it is not difficult to 
show the historical inconveniences and the objective damage of any kind of national-
ism, regardless of what it may look like in the present political situation”. (Agani 
1994a: 84) 
Rugova denied that the Albanians were nationalists or that the Albanian mobilisa-
tion was inspired by nationalism. Instead, Rugova defined the Albanian mobilisation 
as legitimate defence of national and democratic rights and interests threatened by 
Milošević. Rugova (1989b: 190, 191) wrote, “There are nationalists, but this is an 
illness of every nation. I would not say there is nationalism among the Albanian 
masses… Our need for national identity is thought of as nationalism”. 
The LDK leaders admitted that many Serbs felt a strong animosity towards the Al-
banians. (Cana 1990c, 1990d, 1990e; Agani 1994a; Rugova 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 
1990b; Buxhovi 1990c; LDK 1990) However, they rejected any Serb claim that the 
Albanians were the cause or in any way responsible for the creation of their animos-
ity. The Albanians were innocent because they had never harmed or caused any injus-
tice against the Serbs. Rugova rebuffed the claim that the Serbs were leaving Kosovo 
because of ethnic pressure as “… a myth that they [Milošević & co] invented”. (Al-
lain & Galmiche 1994: 90) The Serbs were leaving Kosovo because they could not 
“bear to have Albanians, too, in leading positions”. (Rugova 1989a: 26) Agani 
(1994a: 199) claimed that, “The relocations have many reasons: economic, social, 
family relations etc”. 
Agani refused to accept the idea that the national/ethnic conflicts had an ‘objec-
tive’ base. The Serb animosity was not objective, but the result of old prejudices be-
ing manipulated by the Serb communist leadership. Agani (1994a: 87) wrote, “The 
myth which shows the Albanians as riotous, despotic and tyrant is still preserved, 
indeed, much is done to give it a new strength”. The LDK leaders maintained that 
Milošević and the Serb elite were unable to resolve the political crisis of Commu-
nism. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 158) declared, “... everything began with the 
possibility to choose between Communism and democracy”. Therefore, Milošević 
tried to prolong his reign by inventing the ethnic conflict between the Albanians and 
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the Serbs and transferring the conflict to the other Republics. Agani (1999) wrote, “... 
specifically the unresolved question of Kosova is the main ‘legitimatization’ of this 
regime”. 
The LDK leaders declared that Milošević manipulated the Serb public by enlisting 
the help of certain Serb intellectuals and the Serb media. The Serb intellectuals com-
piled the nationalist programme, known as the Memorandum of the Academy of Sci-
ences of Serbia21. Agani (1994a: 139) depicted the Memorandum as “The Manifest of 
the Serb national-chauvinistic movement, the source and the inspiration of its de-
structive energies, the charter that initiated the crimes and the insanity”. 
Media helped Milošević to accomplish two goals. First, Milošević diverted away 
the attention of the Serbs from the crisis of Communism and the democratisation of 
Yugoslavia. (Rugova 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1989d, 1989e, 1990c; LDK 1990; 
Cana 1989) Agani (1994a: 80, 90) argued, “…some problems and political relations 
are manipulated, some problems are exaggerated with the purpose of covering up 
other questions and problems, or raising non-existent problems… to express some-
thing else than the real interests of their own people”. Second, Milošević legitimised 
the Serb repression over the Albanians. Agani (1994a: 188, 80, 89) wrote, “…new 
illusions are added to the old ones… the former prejudices are fostered and revived, 
adding new mistakes to the old ones… In essence; it [the Serb propaganda] contains 
the message that the Albanians are impossible to live with”. 
The LDK leaders maintained that Milošević was endangering the co-existence be-
tween the ethnic groups. Cana (1989: 180) wrote, “It is an undisputable fact that, in 
Kosova, the old bridges of communication are being destroyed, and the foundations 
of coexistence, relations of good neighbourliness, mutual respect, and aid have been 
undermined”. Nevertheless, Rugova (1989b: 192) called for co-existence between the 
Albanians and the Serbs. “We have to collaborate and live together”. 
5.4 Democracy and self-determination 
The LDK leaders depicted the democratisation of Yugoslavia as the only way to re-
solve the systemic and national crisis. (Rugova 1990a, 1990e) Rugova (1989d: 116) 
declared his confidence, “As I said, the only future is democracy, free elections and 
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free economic enterprise”. Agani (1994a: 91) reinforced his idea, “… the essence of 
the Albanian question in Yugoslavia is democratic, and it can be settled only through 
consistent democratisation”. Agani (1994a: 91) was optimist about the effects of de-
mocratisation as “… the only way to establish democracy and national peace and to 
settle the national conflicts and many others”. 
However, the LDK leaders argued that democratisation presupposed the equality 
of the nations. (Zajmi 1991, 1992b; Rugova 1989b, 1990c, 1990e) Agani (1994a: 
203) wrote, “Equality is the fundamental prerequisite of the consequent democratisa-
tion… There can be no equality- we mean real equality and not verbal egalitarianism- 
if it is not both collective and individual”. Agani (1994a) considered the liberal idea 
of civil liberty and equality as incomplete because the individual equality and pros-
perity were a function of the national equality and prosperity. Agani argued that the 
Albanians were going to enjoy individual equality only if the Albanian nation was 
going to enjoy the same political and institutional rights as the other Yugoslav na-
tions. Agani (1994a: 203) wrote, “Actually, the individual and collective equality 
puts forward the main demand of the Albanians: the recognition of their subjectivity 
in Yugoslavia”. 
Therefore, the main demand was the Republic of Kosovo as equal member of the 
Yugoslav federation. Without the national equality, the democratisation of Yugosla-
via was going to remain incomplete. (Agani 1994a; Rugova 1989e, 1990d; Buxhovi 
1990a) Rugova (1989e: 17) declared, “…Yugoslavia ought to be a democratic federa-
tion of nations and nationalities … so that Kosovo, too, should have its equal place in 
Federal Yugoslavia”.  
5.5 The discourse of self-determination 
The LDK leaders declared that their goal was the Republic of Kosovo equal to all the 
other Yugoslav republics. (Rugova 1989a, 1989b, 1989e, 1990b; Agani 1994a; Bux-
hovi 1989, 1990a, 1990b) Agani argued that the Albanians had the innate right of 
self-determination and the Republic of Kosovo was its expression. Agani maintained 
that self-determination was not a political principle, but rather an objective right that 
belonged to very subject (nation) that fulfilled certain conditions. “In the concrete 
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case, the Albanian nationality, greater in number than some other nations of Yugo-
slavia, with a territorial concentration in proportion to the size of a nation, with many 
cultural and other specific features, has the right of self-determination.” (Agani 
1994a: 94) Rugova supported Agani by claiming that the Albanians had the historical 
right over Kosovo. “Kosova is specific because it has its own historical and active 
ethnos… An Illyrian-Albanian population exited and lived on through the centuries 
in Kosova, too”. (Rugova 1989b: 200, 1988: 126) 
Further, the Republic of Kosovo was going to complete the democratisation of 
Serbia and Yugoslavia. Agani (1994a) quoted Karl Marx that no nation was free if it 
denied the same freedom to another. The Serbs would be free only when the Albani-
ans would enjoy the same freedom. Last, but not least, the Republic of Kosovo was 
the precondition to resolve all the economic and social problems of the Albanian na-
tion and guarantee its national rights. (Rugova 1990b, 1990d; Zajmi 1991, 1992b) 
Until January 1991, the LDK leaders were not anticipating the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and saw the future of Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia. Therefore, their first 
demand was “… [their] inclusion in the processes of Yugoslav development”. 
(Rugova 1989b: 191) The LDK leaders rejected any claim that their goal was seces-
sion from Yugoslavia. Agani (1994a: 91) wrote, “The essence … is not secession-
ism”. The first statute of LDK began with the expression “The Albanians in Yugosla-
via have expressed their free will after the World War II to live in Yugoslavia”. 
Rugova (1989a, 1989e) went even a step further and denied any desire to join Alba-
nia. He rejected the Albanian unification as a Serb propaganda ploy. Rugova (1989b: 
195) retorted, “Albania is the national state of the Albanians, but I was born in Kos-
ova and I consider Yugoslavia my own state. I think that this Albania is pushed too 
often under our noses”. 
However, this declaration of loyalty to Yugoslavia did not stop Rugova from 
threatening with secession and unification. Rugova (1989a: 26) warned, “… if the 
oppression continues, then the people will seek a way out… either in the direction of 
Albania, or in another direction” and again (Rugova 1989b: 195), “However, if this 
policy continues in Kosova, some people will perhaps seek their state in Albania and 
consider it as ‘something better’”. 
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In January 1991, Rugova called a secret meeting of the Coordination Council of 
the Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia. (Surroi 1998a) The Political Declaration 
of this meeting was published on 12 October 1991, immediately after the Referendum 
of Republic of Kosova. Facing the calls of Slovenia and Croatia for independence, 
the leaders of the Albanian political parties formulated three different options for the 
resolution of the Albanian question. First, if the internal and external borders re-
mained unchanged, than the Albanians were going to demand the status of republic 
for Kosovo inside Yugoslavia, the status of constitutive nation in Macedonia and self-
administration in Montenegro and Serbia. The second option anticipated the change 
of the borders between the Republics. In this case, LDK was going to demand the 
creation of the Republic of the Albanians. Third, if external borders of Yugoslavia 
changed, then the Albanians in Yugoslavia with a plebiscite were going to decide the 
territorial unification with Albania. (CCAPPY 1991; Gjeloshi 1992; Allain & Gal-
miche 1994) 
5.6 The strategy to achieve the political goal 
In retrospective, the LDK leaders admitted that they had no prepared/elaborated strat-
egy to answer to Milošević. (Zajmi 1993b) Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994) ex-
cused the tactical deficiencies with the lack of time and the rapid political develop-
ment. The pace of events forced the LDK to improvise underway. 
The LDK concluded that two factors were influencing the development of the 
Yugoslav crisis. The first factor was the intervention of the Yugoslav federative insti-
tutions, Slovenia, and Croatia. In 1968, after the first Albanian demonstrations, Tito 
intervened and expanded the autonomy of Kosovo. Although, disillusioned with the 
Federative institutions and their appeasement policy towards Milošević, the LDK 
leaders continued to expect for a similar solution, from above and outside Kosovo. 
The Federative institutions, Slovenia, and Croatia were going to resolve the conflict 
in the favour of the Albanians, just as Tito did in 1966-1968. (Buxhovi 1989; Zajmi 
1991) Cana (1989: 181) wrote, “What is going to stop them [the Serbs] and bring 
them to their senses? Perhaps a new Brioni Plenum22?! But perhaps for this we have 
still to wait”. Cana (1990a: 49) would repeat the same idea; “The future of Kosova 
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depends totally on the stand of the other peoples of Yugoslavia… It also depends on 
the ratio of forces in Yugoslavia… We can hope for something to be done only if the 
other republics oppose Serbia, if they will eventually succeed in persuading the 
Yugoslav presidency to set up an unbiased state commission to deal with the question 
of Kosovo”. Rugova (1989a) called for the help of the Federal institutions, also, “… 
it is the right moment for them to intervene and stop the Serbian arbitrariness”. 
The second factor was the role and the strategy of the Albanian movement. The 
LDK leadership was split in two groups: the radicals that called for the escalation of 
the conflict, and the moderates that opposed any such move. The decision rested on 
Rugova (1989a, 1989b) and he wavered between contradictory statements. In the 
same interview, Rugova (1989a: 24) spoke against any armed actions: “My impres-
sion is that there are forces in Yugoslavia which desire precisely terrorist actions in 
Kosova. If shots are fired from amongst us, this serves as a justification to step up the 
repression… You can imagine who engages in such speculations”. However, to the 
question: “Are they [the Albanians] preparing for a civil war?” Rugova (1989a: 24, 
27) answered clearly and unequivocally “People see no other way out. During the 
protests is always like this: if you do not get any echo, than you should shout even 
lauder. … If Serbia goes on suppressing our national identity, then there will be an 
uprising”. 
In a second interview, Rugova (1989b: 193) tried to correct his previous statement 
(Rugova 1989a). “I said ‘insurrection’ in the meaning of an attempt to redress injus-
tices, not in the meaning of ‘armed uprising’ as it is attributed to me by the Belgrade 
press now”. However, Rugova (1989b: 194) concluded the interview once more with 
a fierce statement, “If pressure and policies, which lead to the restriction of our rights 
are continued, disturbances can be expected. Only I do not know in what form. The 
consequences could be catastrophic”. 
The detention of 245 Albanian intellectuals in March 1989 was a warning (Rugova 
1989a, 1989c, 1989d) that it was more at stake than their university tenures. Rugova 
was convinced that his name was in a second detention list that for unknown reasons 
remained unused. Rugova (1989b: 187) confessed, “It is hard on me to meet people 
in the street and to find out that they are astonished I am still free”. The massacres 
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committed by the Serb police during January-February 1990 forced Rugova to decide 
definitely about the LDK tactic. (Rugova 1990a, 1990c) On January 31, 1990, 
Rugova (1990d) “… made a statement to Prishtina TV demanding the cessation of 
rallies so as to avoid further bloodshed”. On 30 June 1990, Rugova (Declaration of 
APPK 1990), in the name of the Albanian Political Parties in Kosova called again “… 
upon all its citizens not to respond to provocation, to avoid conflict, and at the same 
time to remain vigilant, observe events closely”. 
Rugova declared that LDK would stand to the Serb violence through civil disobe-
dience. Rugova provided only one practical advice to the Albanians: do not react. 
Agani (1994a: 95) explained the new strategy. “We think about the solution of Kos-
ovo only as a peaceful solution. War and violence can only ‘strengthen’ the occupa-
tion, deepen the crisis, but can not resolve and overcome it”. 
First, Rugova became convinced that Milošević was trying to provoke an uprising. 
“At present Belgrade acts according to this logic: we kill them first, then sit down and 
talk with the rest of them”. (Rugova 1990c: 147) Milošević was going to exploit any 
act of violence as an excuse to massacre and expulse as many Albanians as possible. 
(Buxhovi 1990b) Rugova (Impact International 1992: 10) summarised, “In fact, the 
Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We 
believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than to be massacred”. 
Second, Rugova concluded that the Albanians could not resist against the Yugo-
slav police and army. Rugova (Impact International 1992: 10) justified his fear of 
armed actions, “We are not certain how strong the Serbian military presence in the 
province actually is, but we do know that it is overwhelming and that we have noth-
ing to set against the tanks and the other modern weaponry in Serbian hands. … We 
would have no chance of successfully resisting the army”. 
Third, the LDK leaders (Rugova 1989a) believed that any insurrection in Kosovo 
would help Milošević to mobilise the Serbs along the ethnic lines and away from de-
mocratisation. Buxhovi (1990c: 152) wrote, “We are convinced that the forces which 
are interested in the preservation of the current situation in Kosova and Yugoslavia, 
also, encourage the present excesses, which help them to remain in power”. 
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Forth, Rugova believed that Milošević would use any armed action to discredit the 
Albanian movement by representing it as terrorism. “And if the resistance of the Al-
banians against Serbian hegemony can be denounced in foreign countries as terror-
ism, then it can be calculated that international sympathy for our cause will soon 
pass.” (Rugova 1989a: 24) 
Fifth, the LDK leaders believed that Milošević was a short-lived phenomenon. 
Agani (1994a: 90) wrote, On the contrary, we must see the crisis as something tem-
porary that can be overcome”. Rugova (1989b: 197) shared the same idea, “I think 
that his [Milošević’s] policy won’t last long. He had gone far enough, and here I am 
referring not only to Kosova and Serbia, but also to the whole Yugoslavia”. Rugova 
believed that even Milošević knew that and therefore, he was looking for a quick con-
frontation. On the contrary, the Albanians benefited from a strategy that postponed 
the confrontation. 
5.7 The Albanians under the Serb occupation 
Rugova (1989b: 199) had declared already in 1989, that Serbia occupied Kosovo af-
ter the Balkan Wars and separated it from Albania. Against their will, the Albanians 
in Kosovo became part of Serbia instead of their mother-state: Albania. As the Yugo-
slav dissolution was speeding up, the LDK leaders developed this idea further: Kos-
ovo was under Serb occupation. (Agani 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1998r; Rugova 1993b, 
1994b; Zajmi 1993a, 1993b, 1994a; Cana 1993) 
The LDK leaders argued that historically and legally speaking, Kosovo was a dis-
tinct territory inhabited by the Albanians that joined Yugoslavia after the WWII as an 
independent unit and not as part of Serbia. Further, the 1974 Yugoslav constitution 
granted to Kosovo all the prerogatives of a Republic inside the Yugoslav federation. 
Last, but not least, LDK leaders declared that the constitutional changes initiated by 
Milošević, and approved under violence, were illegal. They did not represent the will 
of the Albanians, but were the legal camouflage that Serbia used to occupy Kosovo. 
Agani (1994a: 93) wrote, “The Serb hegemonic aggression against Kosova and the 
Albanians was intensive since 1981, but during the period 1989-1990 it developed to 
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the complete and violent demolition of the political-constitutional position of Kosova 
and the Albanians in former Yugoslavia”. 
The LDK leaders used every chance to point out the systematic violence that 
Milošević (and the Serbs) was exercising over the Albanians in order to preserve the 
occupation of Kosovo. (Agani 1993, 1994a, 1996a, 1998r; Cana 1993; Ismajli 1993; 
Zajmi 1993a, 1993b) Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 56, 60) declared, “We are 
experiencing the effects of a massive and everyday terror… Yes, as it’s often said, 
[Kosovo] is ‘a vast prison’ or ‘a concentration camp’”. The LDK leaders accused 
Milošević of committing genocide. His goal was to expulse silently and slowly the 
Albanians from their historical territories and change the ethnic structure of Kosovo. 
(Agani 1994a; Bukoshi 1998c) Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 57, 62) declared, 
“The key word is quiet ‘ethnic cleansing’ … people still leave because of repression”. 
The LDK leaders erased any difference between Milošević, Serbia and the Serbs in 
Kosovo. The LDK leaders represented the Serbs in Kosovo as part of the occupying 
force. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 55, 107, 114) wrote, “We are totally occu-
pied, ruled by the Serb minority and the Belgrade leaders. … 8% Serbs [in Kosovo] 
…have the power in their hands. … Because, they armed the Serb civilians in 1991- 
with every kind of weapon”. 
5.8 The Republic of Kosovo 
The Badinter Advisory and Arbitration Commission, the Conferences of London and 
Hague decided to respect the internal borders and grant the international recognition 
only to the republics. Privately, Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 175) called the 
international recognition of Macedonia ‘a catastrophe’ because it put an end at their 
dream of uniting all the Albanians in Yugoslavia in one republic. In the end of 1992, 
Rugova summoned again the Coordination Council of the Albanian Political Parties. 
The Council released a new declaration. “We, as Coordination Council withdrew 
from the third option of the unification of our nation, as it was emphasised if Yugo-
slavia was dissolved, because the international factors do not support the Albanian 
question… Our nation is unprepared for war… However, with our peaceful policy we 
shall arrive, understandably a little ‘slower’, to the realisation of our national de-
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mands”. (Kelmendi 1998: 19) From that moment, Rugova spoke only about the ques-
tion of Kosovo. Rugova justified the political changes with the need to be realistic 
and pragmatic. The Albanians could not challenge the decisions of the European 
Powers. If they pushed with the Albanian unification, they risked losing even Kosovo 
to Serbia. (Clark 2000) 
The LDK leaders debated three possible solutions for Kosovo. The first, proposed 
by Drašković and later Ćosić, called for the division of Kosovo between Serbia and 
Albania. Agani (Schmidt 1996) interpreted it as “… a proof that the original national-
ist aggression has been defeated”. The LDK leaders argued that this plan revealed 
that Serbia was interested on the natural resources and had no significant historical or 
ethnic interests in Kosovo. (Zajmi 1993c; Rugova 1993a, 1993e) Therefore, Rugova 
(1993f, 1995f) rejected the plan in unequivocal terms, “Our stance is clear, that it can 
neither be done nor accepted any division of Kosovo… It is clear that now Serbia 
offers the division where it shall take all the areas with natural and economic re-
sources. This is unacceptable. …For us, as well as for the West, this is unacceptable”. 
Further, Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 94) declared, “This is not a solution, be-
cause almost 1 million Albanians were going to remain outside a reduced Kosova”. 
The second solution was the 1974 autonomy under international guarantee. Agani 
admitted that autonomy under international guarantees represented an improvement 
from the lawless situation. However, the LDK refused to accept autonomy as the final 
solution for Kosovo. Agani (Judah 2000a: 93) declared, “To tell us we have to be part 
of Serbia means we have to continue to suffer under Serbian occupation. This line has 
no perspective”. Agani (1994a: 97) argued that the autonomy-solution “… does not 
take into account the fact that the former autonomy of Kosova cannot be reinstated 
because Yugoslavia does not exist any longer”. Even more important, the former 
autonomy proved to be vulnerable and it failed to protect the Albanians from the Serb 
abuses of power. Rugova (1995b: 2) repeatedly rejected the autonomy as a solution 
“… because we have a very bad experience with the Yugoslav federation”. A new 
autonomous Kosovo, albeit under international guarantees, was going to suffer from 
the same deficiencies. (Rugova 1993c, 1993e, 1993f, 1994c, 1995a, 1995b; Bukoshi 
1994; Agani 1994b, 1996a; Zajmi 1993a, 1993b, 1994b) Rugova (1995b: 2) wrote, 
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“This means that we have to find an ethnic solution, in which we should be free of 
fear”. 
The third option was the independence of Kosovo. The LDK organised a referen-
dum, (exactly as Slovenia and Croatia) on September 26-30, 1991. 99.87% of the 
voters supported the independence of Kosovo. The LDK leaders represented the Al-
banian demand for statehood as part of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and not seces-
sion. Agani (1998f) wrote, “In Yugoslavia, Kosovo was a constituent element, with a 
defined border. That Yugoslavia does not exist anymore. Moreover, as with the other 
states- Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Macedonia- Kosovo should have the right to decide 
its own status… present-day Yugoslavia is a new state, and it is not our state… In 
reality, this new state is Serbia”. 
Rugova argued that the only right solution that could provide security for the Al-
banians was the independent Republic of Kosovo. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 
110) kept repeating, “Today, we cannot remain alone with Serbia and we demand our 
independence” in every meeting with foreign diplomats. Agani (1994a: 87) wrote, 
“The independent Republic of Kosovo is the fundamental demand of the Albanians”. 
The Serbs had to understand that they could neither change the ethnic composition of 
Kosovo nor continue endlessly to suppress the Albanian majority. (Agani 1994b; Za-
jmi 1993a, 1994a; Rugova 1994b, 1994c, 1994d, 1996a, 1996b; Bukoshi 1996b) 
The LDK leaders rebuffed the Serb claims over Kosovo. They repeated that the 
Albanians had the right to establish the Republic of Kosovo because they had the 
right of self-determination. The LDK leaders argued that the Albanians in Kosovo 
possessed both the historical right and the ethnic right over Kosovo. Historically, they 
were the autochthon nation in Kosovo inhabiting it since antiquity. Further, the Alba-
nians were a sufficiently large national group that constituted the majority of the 
population in Kosovo. (Agani 1994a; Rugova 1993b, 1994b, 1996a, 1996b; Zajmi 
1993a, 1993b, 1994a) 
However, Rugova soon understood that the strongest point was that Serbia had no 
moral right and legitimacy to rule over Kosovo. The LDK leaders emphasised that 
Serbia had lost any moral right to rule over the Albanians. Milošević and Serbia were 
refusing to respect the national and democratic rights of the Albanians and were pur-
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suing an open genocide and ethnic cleansing programme. Agani (1994a: 101) wrote, 
“After more than 10 years of discrimination and terror to the Albanians, in the condi-
tions of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia cannot get support based on the princi-
ple of uti possidetis”. 
Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994) proposed as a temporary step towards full in-
dependence a form of international protectorate in Kosovo. First, Rugova specified 
that the international protectorate (he called it a trusteeship) would calm the situation, 
re-build the administrative, economic, and social institutions, and give time for politi-
cal talks about the future of Kosovo. Second, Rugova hoped that during the protec-
torate period, the Serbs were going to loose the war, Milošević was going to be re-
moved from power and the Serbs would simply abandon Kosovo. (Rugova 1993a, 
1993c, 1994a, 1994c, 1994d, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a; Agani 1994a, 1994b) 
5.9 The strategy to achieve the political goals 
The LDK leaders designed the civil resistance as a temporary tactic. However, once 
established, the strategy remained unchanged because Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 
1994: 141) saw “No, no other solution” regarding the means to fight the occupation. 
Rugova (Kelmendi 1998: 32) emphasised, “Those that support the war, are some-
where else, in Tirana, or in Europe, but not in Kosovo… Let them come here and we 
shall see… We support only peaceful means”. Agani (1994a: 95) explained, “We 
think about the solution for Kosova only as a peaceful solution, war and violence can 
only ‘reinforce’ the occupation and deepen the crisis, but cannot resolve and surpass 
it”. 
The LDK leaders continued to believe that Milošević aimed at provoking a new 
confrontation and the subsequent expulsion of the Albanians. Rugova (Allain & Gal-
miche 1994: 117) said, “They provoke us, hoping for a massacre…. We have the 
same fear: that our people come out of their houses and react. They [the Serbs] intend 
this… They do not need many soldiers- look, there are not many soldiers around Sa-
rajevo, - and it is enough to push the buttons. With us, it is going to be even worse. 
Because, they intend the complete ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. It is going to be a 
massacre”. Agani argued that Milošević could also start an armed conflict in Kosovo 
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in order to manipulate the political situation in Serbia. Agani (1994a: 96) wrote, “In 
the case of an eventual crisis inside Serbia, the Serb regime would prefer to transfer 
the conflict in Kosova”. 
Therefore, Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 109, 170) argued that because of the 
situation “The problem for us is to save the people …the goal of our policy is to 
avoid the tragedy”. The LDK leaders concluded that their primary duty was to control 
the population in order to avoid any reaction against the Serbs that could provoke ‘the 
confrontation’. (Rugova 1993c, 1995d, 1995e, 1996a, 1996b) Rugova (Allain & Gal-
miche 1994: 108) wrote, “We have to be very careful, because every move from our 
side is a pretext for massive imprisonment and maltreatment, especially of the intel-
lectuals and the leaders of our movement”. 
Rugova (1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) maintained that civil disobedience was the 
only possible form of resistance and it was proving itself as very successful. Rugova 
(Allain & Galmiche 1994: 140) wrote, “…because of this patience we have won time. 
This is a more difficult road, but it is safer”. The other LDK leaders supported the 
same idea that their first concern was to save the Albanians. Agani (Allain & Gal-
miche 1994: 140) was quoted saying “The policy of Rugova saved the nation”. 
Further, Rugova argued that a change of strategy was going to diminish the sup-
port from the Western powers. Rugova (Kelmendi 1998: 32) wrote, “Those that sup-
port other forms of activity aim to stop the internationalisation of the Albanian ques-
tion, the support for us in the world, exactly at the moment when we have arrived at 
the time that Kosova is put forward as a question to be resolved, and the nation to 
remain under occupation”.    
Rugova complemented the fear of the Serb retaliation with moral/cultural argu-
ments. Rugova continuously tried to persuade the Western diplomats that the civil 
resistance was an expression of the Albanian cultural setting. Rugova (Allain & Gal-
miche 1994: 130) declared, “The practice of non-violence in this situation corre-
sponds to an aspect of our character, to a tradition of patience and prudence in the 
face of all dominations”. Rugova claimed that the Albanians had embraced the Euro-
pean values and their movement was modern and European. Rugova (Clark 2000: 67) 
declared, “We have learnt that non-violence is the modern European preference”. 
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The second pillar was the activity of the Serb actors. The LDK represented any 
contact with the Serb institutions/opposition as an act of betrayal ‘because it gave 
legitimacy to the occupation of Kosovo’. (QIK 1993; Rugova 1993c; Agani 1994a; 
Schmidt 1997) However, the main reason was that the Serb opposition was unable to 
depose Milošević. Further, Panić did not support the right of self-determination for 
the Albanians and offered to resolve the question of Kosovo through ‘self-
government’ and ‘self-administration’. (Agani 1994a: 228) Agani (Judah 2000a: 79) 
said, “Panić is offering crumbs but it is not enough to resolve the crisis. … We cannot 
give total support to Panić because his position is not total support for us. The posi-
tion of Panić is to reduce problems rather than resolve them”. Therefore, although 
under strong international pressure, the LDK refused to participate in the Serbian 
elections when Panić challenged Milošević for the presidency of Serbia 
The third pillar of LDK strategy was the support of the international community. 
The LDK leaders were convinced that USA and the European Union were going to 
play the decisive role in granting independence to Kosovo. Agani (1994a: 91) wrote, 
“In the process of Yugoslav dissolution… the international factor was and is very 
present, in a direct way, and in many cases also, in a decisive way… We should em-
phasise in this case the positive development and the democratisation of the interna-
tional relations … in searching for the peaceful solution of the problems”. The confi-
dence of the LDK leaders grew even stronger after the President Bush delivered the 
Christmas Warning (December 1992) to Milošević. (Danner 1999; Clark 2000; Judah 
2000a) 
Even as the war was raging through Bosnia, Rugova continued to hope for an in-
ternational intervention in Kosovo. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 58, 64) de-
clared, “I bet … on my confidence on the international institutions. I still believe… I 
want to hope a little longer”. Rugova (1995e) was so confident that he did not hesi-
tate to declare that he expected Kosovo to be independent and part of the European 
integration process by year 2000. 
Rugova (1995e) believed that “… the spheres of interests in Europe… [that] ex-
isted during the Cold War” belonged to the past. The European integration was creat-
ing a new Europe based on justice and morality. Therefore, Rugova (1995a, 1995b, 
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1995b) believed that the USA and EU would feel morally obligated to stop the Serb 
violence and reward the Albanians for their civic resistance. Rugova inflated the me-
dia with the alleged support of the international community for the question of Kos-
ovo. “Kosovo is put forward in every international organisation… Of course, we 
should never be satisfied, but we should not forget these successes, produce defeat-
ism, disappointment etc.” (Rugova 1994b) “We should be satisfied that everyone is 
sad about our situation here and that they follow constantly the situation in Kosovo, 
especially the USA and I can add all the European countries.” (Rugova 1995a) 
Rugova (1996a: 2) declared, “We hope as well, that the international community 
shall take into consideration our contribution to the peace in our region… I am con-
vinced that we are going to be rewarded for this”. “USA have expressed respect and 
have supported continuously our policy of peaceful non-violence and avoidance of 
conflicts. This is recognition and help for our cause; this is a concrete recognition of 
our organisation, of our concept of state…” (Rugova 1996b) 
Further, Rugova believed that the violation of the human and national rights was 
going to force the Europeans to conclude that any solution inside Yugoslavia was 
impossible. (Rugova 1993e; Zajmi 1993a; Agani 1994a) This belief was another rea-
son that prevented the LDK from supporting Panić or the Serb opposition. McDowell 
(1993: 12) summarised the LDK policy, “Unless Serbia continues to be labelled as 
profoundly evil- and they themselves, by virtue of being anti-Serb, as the good guys- 
they are unlikely to achieve their goals”. The LDK arrived to the conclusion: The 
more the Albanians suffered under the Serb occupation, the better chance they had to 
get help from the Western powers. Agani (Judah 2000a: 79) formulated, “Frankly, it 
is better [for us] to continue with Milošević. … Milošević was very successful in de-
stroying Yugoslavia and, in the same way, if he continues, he will destroy Serbia”. 
Last, the LDK leaders listened very carefully to different Western declarations. For 
example, Warren Christopher (Danner 1999: 10) pointed “We [USA] fear that if the 
Serbian influence extends into [Kosovo and or Macedonia], it will bring into the fray 
other countries in the region- Albania, Greece, Turkey… So the stakes for the United 
States are to prevent the broadening of that conflict to bring in our NATO allies and 
to bring in vast sections of Europe, and perhaps, as happened before, broadening into 
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a world war”. Therefore, the LDK leaders maximized the danger of out-spill in order 
to gain support for their cause. (Agani 1994a; Rugova 1995b) 
5.10 The Dayton Peace Accord and the LDK dilemma 
The Dayton Peace Accord increased the expectations, although it did not mention the 
Albanians at all. Rugova speculated and overestimated three separate events. First, 
the USA and EU conditioned the outer wall of sanctions with the resolution of the 
question of Kosovo. The LDK leaders considered the sanctions as a victory for the 
Albanians, their demands and their civil disobedience tactics. Second, USA opened 
an information office in Prishtina. Agani represented it as an embassy in embryo, i.e. 
USA was treating Kosovo as a state in-making. Rugova (1996b) said, “The opening 
of this office creates possibilities for next step towards the resolution of the Albanian 
question”. Third, the LDK leadership deliberately speculated about a secret appendix 
to the Dayton Peace Accord regarding the status of Kosovo. (Agani 1996a, 1996b; 
Rugova 1996a, 1996b; Clark 2000) 
It proved to be a short relief. Only three moths latter, the EU announced that it was 
stabilising its relationships with FRY. Germany recognised the former Yugoslavia 
and prepared to return the Albanian refugees. Bukoshi (Judah 2000a: 125) declared, 
“It was a shock. We weren’t expecting it and it was a fatal mistake”. Bukoshi blamed 
the tactics that the LDK had pursued since 1990. “Meanwhile this non-violent atti-
tude is viewed by Belgrade as an invitation to increase oppression and is seen by the 
international community as an excuse to ignore the situation”. (Kosova Communica-
tion 164) The LDK leaders understood that the civil disobedience had failed and 
those who fought in Bosnia, they won. Agani (Hedges 1998) summarized the Dayton 
Accord: “We learned that violence works. It is the only way, in this part of the world, 
to achieve what you want and get the attention of the international community.” 
Rugova came under pressure to change the tactics. (Bukoshi 1996a) Bukoshi, the 
Prime Minister in exile, criticised openly Rugova “for lack of perspective”. “This 
year has taught us that the international community may move, may help, but it can 
never solve the whole issue, even less the capital issue. Everyone ought to do that 
himself”. (Bukoshi 1998c) Nevertheless, the LDK leaders rejected a change of the 
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tactics and refused to co-operate with the KLA because they did not believe that KLA 
could succeed in fighting the Serbs. (Agani 1998g, 1998w) 
Rugova was also under strong pressure from the USA and EU to renounce inde-
pendence and began talks with Milošević. Agani (Balkans Watch 1.3) explained, 
“These diplomats threaten us by saying ‘If you don’t do this, you will be in your 
own; the West will go’. However, Rugova could not renounce independence that easy 
because he judged the co-existence with Serbia as impossible. Agani (1999f) de-
clared, “For the Albanians, the difficulty is to accept the integrity and sovereignty of 
Yugoslavia… We feel there is no future in Serbia and Yugoslavia”. 
Under international pressure, Rugova was forced to meet Milošević in Belgrade, 
on May 15, 1998. De facto, Rugova renounced the independence and accepted to 
held talks with Milošević without the presence of international mediators. However, 
Rugova could not renounce independence de jure without some embellishment from 
the West and the support of the other Albanian leaders. (Lutovac 1997) Holbrooke 
organised a reception for Rugova by the US president, Clinton, on May 29, 1998. 
Upon his return to Kosovo, Rugova tried on two occasions, in July and August 1998, 
to get the support of Adem Demaçi and Rexhep Qosja. Both refused to support the 
renunciation of independence and denounced Rugova. Agani excused ‘the lack of 
unity’. “But we can’t unite for anything less than independence, without that the war 
will continue”. (Balkans Watch 1.3) 
The LDK was under strong international pressure to begin talks with the Serb au-
thorities. Rugova kept his silence, while Agani began to deliberate the compromise: 
Kosovo as the third republic of Yugoslavia. Agani (1998q) concluded, “Therefore we 
[should] engage for an interim settlement which would guarantee Kosova an equal 
status with the other units of FRY”. Agani (1998q) rejected, “… that the settlement 
should be sought within the framework of Serbia… there is no one in Kosova who is 
prepared to accept settlements, which legalize the Serbian rule in Kosova”. Agani 
recognised that Rugova could not renounce independence and therefore, he called for 
an international conference that would impose an agreement. Agani (1998m) de-
clared, “Even the agreement on such compromise proposals is difficult, and perhaps it 
will need to be imposed”. 
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Therefore, Agani (1999e) described the Rambouillet talks as the best chance to 
succeed. Agani (1999d) was convinced that the Albanians had no other choice than 
“… to reach a compromise solution only in the way the international community pro-
jects it”. However, Agani did not consider the compromise as the final solution. It 
was more a postponement of the final solution and not a renouncement of the demand 
for independence. “After the deployment of the NATO troops in Kosova, which is a 
substantial component of the Agreement and a necessary prerequisite for its imple-
mentation, it is understandable that there can be no talk of Yugoslavia’s integrity and 
sovereignty in Kosova”. (Agani 1999e) Agani believed that after some time the Serbs 
were going to lose their interest on Kosovo and resign before the Albanian stamina. 
“Many people in Serbia today cannot understand this. But tomorrow many more 
will”. (Agani 1999f) 
5.11 Summary 
The LDK leaders began their discourse by representing the political situation. They 
described the Albanian nation as living under repression and discrimination. How-
ever, they concentrated themselves in depicting Milošević as an existential threat to 
the Albanians in Yugoslavia. They associated him with Ranković, Čubrilović, expul-
sions and massacres aiming to destroy everything Albanian. The LDK leaders spoke 
about the final confrontation between the Albanians and the Serb leadership. Either 
they would succeed in creating the Republic of Kosovo or they would loose every 
national right and leave Kosovo forever. 
The LDK leaders’ juxtaposition of the Albanians and the Serbs disputed the Serb 
discourse about the Albanian as malicious and a threat to the Serbs, Serbia, and even 
Europe. The LDK discourse represented the Albanians as innocent, discriminated, 
and persecuted. The Serbs, on the other side, enjoyed every national right and privi-
lege. They had no reason to feel threatened or discriminated by the Albanians. Their 
animosity towards the Albanians had no ‘material base’, and it was the product of 
elite manipulation. Milošević could not resolve the political and economic crisis and 
invented the ‘the Albanian threat’ in order to divert the attention of the Serbs. 
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The LDK leaders challenged the Milošević discourse about the Albanians and 
Kosovo, but they remained well-inside the frames of the official Yugoslav (Tito) dis-
course of ‘brotherhood and unity’. The LDK leaders claimed that they were not na-
tionalists, i.e. against ‘brotherhood’. They claimed that ethnic conflicts were unnatu-
ral and artificial bourgeoisie creations. Likewise, the official Yugoslav discourse 
treated every demand for secession as a mortal sin. The LDK leaders denied that their 
goal was secession and swore their loyalty to the ‘unity’ of Yugoslavia. 
The LDK leaders called for the democratisation of Kosovo and Yugoslavia. How-
ever, they described the national equality as a necessary part of democracy. The LDK 
leaders described democracy both as a goal in itself, and as a means to realise the 
right of self-determination, i.e. the Republic of Kosovo. The LDK leaders emphasised 
that the right of self-determination was not a political principle, but a legal right. The 
Albanians fulfilled the criteria and therefore, they had the right to have their own Re-
public, equal to other Yugoslav nations. The Albanians could become equal citizens 
of Yugoslavia only if Kosovo was equal to the other Yugoslav units. 
The most interesting point here is the strategy of the LDK. The LDK leaders de-
bated the possible actions they could undertake to answer to the Serb violence: to 
escalate the situation, i.e. armed uprising, or to calm the situation, i.e. peaceful resis-
tance. The decision was purely pragmatic. Rugova came at the conclusion that 
Milošević was looking for an escalation, while the Albanians were unprepared for 
war. The LDK leaders thought that Milošević would not last for more than a year and 
they could hold on a year. Therefore, Rugova called for the cessation of demonstra-
tions and protests. The LDK leaders foresaw that the conflict was going to be re-
solved, as in 1968, in a party plenum pushing Milošević out of power opening the 
way for the democratisation of Yugoslavia and restoring the autonomy of Kosovo. 
After the restoration of autonomy, the LDK was going to demand via legal channels 
the status of republic. 
The second phase begins with the declaration of independence of Slovenia and 
Croatia. The LDK leaders followed Slovenia and Croatia challenging both the Serb 
and Yugoslav discourse. The Albanians were no longer loyal citizens of Yugoslavia. 
They were a nation surviving under a ruthless occupation, colonisation and oppres-
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sion since 1878. Simultaneously, the LDK leaders called the Serb living in Kosovo 
part of the occupation force. Rugova argued that the Serbs were controlling (and 
could control) Kosovo through open and ruthless violence denying to the Albanians 
every national and human right. 
The LDK leaders had formulated three different goals based on three different sce-
narios. According to these options, if the external borders of Yugoslavia were going 
to change, then the Albanians in Yugoslavia were going to demand the unification 
with Albania. However, the external borders changed, and Rugova decided to de-
mand only the independent Republic of Kosovo. There was another pragmatic deci-
sion camouflaged as the decision of the Coordination Council of the Albanian Politi-
cal Parties in Yugoslavia. USA and EU had recognised Macedonia and Montenegro 
as independent states and they did not support a change of borders in favour of the 
Albanian question. 
Rugova represented the independent Republic of Kosovo as the only right solution 
for the Albanians in Yugoslavia. The Albanians in Kosovo had the right of self-
determination because they possessed both the historical and the ethnic right over 
Kosovo. Further, only the Republic of Kosovo could save the Albanians permanently 
from the Serb wrath. The LDK leaders used every instance of Serb violence against 
the Albanians as evidence that living with the Serbs or compromising with them was 
simply impossible. Rugova and his closest associates repeated in every press confer-
ence that the Western powers were showing respect for the peaceful resistance, they 
would reward the Albanians for their resistance and that the question of Kosovo was 
making progress. 
The LDK leaders continued to believe that Milošević aimed at a quick and bloody 
victory against the Albanians. The LDK leaders decided against armed resistance in 
favour of peaceful resistance because they were convinced that they would suffer 
massive losses and could not succeed, and not because of some political or cultural 
aversion towards violence. Again, the LDK leaders believed that the solution of the 
Albanian question was going to come from a third factor, this time European Union 
and USA. Once, he had decided, Rugova refused to revision the LDK tactics. He la-
belled every opponent of his policy as irrational and even worse, a provocateur. 
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The third phase corresponds with the period after the Dayton agreement. It became 
clear that the international community, contrary to the declarations of Rugova, was 
not supporting the independence of Kosovo. Instead, EU and USA were putting pres-
sure on Rugova to begin direct talks with Milošević. Rugova faced a dilemma: to re-
nounce the referendum or to begin the armed resistance. Rugova was convinced that 
the Albanians could not fight against the Serbs and rejected every armed action. The 
massacres in Bosnia only reinforced his conviction that the armed resistance was im-
possible. At the same time, Rugova hesitated to renounce independence and accept 
some form of autonomy. For many years, Rugova had convinced the Albanians that 
independence was the only right solution, and that the international community was 
showing increasing understanding for the Republic of Kosovo. Rugova made en ef-
fort to repeat the rejection of the Albanian unification in favour of the Republic of 
Kosovo. He tried to diminish the damage of an agreement ‘less than independence’ 
with Milošević. Therefore, he tried to secure the presence of USA representatives in 
talks and to enlist the support of the Albanian opposition. However, both Qosja and 
Demaçi refused to support the renunciation of the 1991 Referendum. 
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6. THE DEMOCRATIC OPTION 
6.1 The democrats and their self-image 
The democrats, (Maliqi, Surroi) were heirs of the Albanian Communist elite. Maliqi’s 
father, a member of the old guard, was appointed Secretary of Interior of Kosovo, 
after the 1981 demonstrations. The father of Surroi served as Yugoslavia‘s ambassa-
dor in Spain, Mexico, etc. They attended the Serb classes with Serb teachers because, 
as Maliqi (1998b) explained, they held a higher standard than the Albanian ones. 
Subsequently, they continued their studies at the University of Belgrade (Maliqi), 
University of Zagreb (Kullashi) and University of Mexico City (Surroi). The democ-
rats resided in Prishtina, the provincial capital, and enjoyed a more than satisfactory 
life standard, a well-paid job, and comfortable housing. In general, they perceived 
themselves as sophisticated and modern to the newly arrived in Prishtina. Even more 
important, in words of Maliqi, they did not experience any form of ethnic discrimina-
tion or discomfort during their youth protected by their fathers’ political position. 
Maliqi (1998b) reported some trouble because of his support for the 1968 student 
movement in Belgrade. 
The democrats considered themselves as social democrats, modernists, and Euro-
peans. As supporters of the democratic socialism they criticised the Yugoslav system 
as dogmatic and bureaucratised, and sympathised with the ‘liberals’ gathered around 
Praxis. However, none of them engaged in any serious act of political opposition be-
fore 1989. As modernists and Europeans, they opposed, more through their life-style 
than through their political activity, the Albanian conservative and nationalist intelli-
gentsia. 
In 1989, the democrats tried to take the initiative from ‘the Albanian extremists’. 
(Maliqi 1998b: 231) Their first effort was the Association of Philosophers and Soci-
ologists that gave birth eventually to three political parties: the Kosovo branch of the 
Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI)23, the Social-Democratic Party of Kosovo and 
the Youth Parliament of Kosovo (latter renamed the Parliamentarian Party of Kos-
 62 
ovo). Maliqi (1989b) described his participation in politics as, “I have been and I am 
still on the sideline and naive in politics, one who has become involved not from de-
sire, but because a forest, a jungle, has been created around us in which, calls for 
unity and tribal-political line-ups are constantly heard. I have not been able to close 
my eyes to these things that are happening… Secretly, I want each article… to be my 
last political venture, but I get involved again and betray myself, because I have a 
terrible fear of the consequences of… the policy being pursued. I write to drive away 
my fear”. Their political campaign was rather short, because Kullashi immigrated to 
France (1990), Surroi moved to London as a journalist for BBC (1992), while Maliqi 
was forced to resign as chair of the Social-Democratic Party. 
6.2 The crisis of real socialism and elite manipulation 
The democrats maintained that Yugoslavia was not a victim of ethnic conflicts, but 
rather the victim of “… the systemic crisis of the real socialism”. (Surroi 1998a) 
Maliqi supported Surroi by declaring that ethnicity and/or Kosovo were not responsi-
ble for the Yugoslav crisis. “Kosovo may have been the catalyst of the crisis, but not 
its essence”. (Maliqi 1998b: 128) The democrats argued that Yugoslavia was going to 
be in crisis even if Kosovo was not part of Yugoslavia. (Kullashi 1989, 1990; Maliqi 
1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1994, 1998b; Surroi 1989a) Maliqi (Magaš 1993: 238) summa-
rised, “We are dealing with a crisis of state socialism which has used up its historical 
credit. Everywhere the party-state is falling apart”. Kullashi formulated the same 
idea, although in a different language. “The fundamental source of the crisis of Kos-
ova, Serbia and Yugoslavia lies in the absolute domination of the political sphere 
over the other spheres of socio-economic and cultural life”. (Kullashi 1989: 63) 
The democrats were careful to use the proper phraseology. (Magaš 1993; Kullashi 
1990; Maliqi 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992g, 1998b; Surroi 1989a) They rejected that 
they were the enemy and referred to themselves as the democratic opposition. They 
did not identify the opposite forces in national terms as Serb, Albanian etc, but as the 
Kosovo nomenclature/authorities (Berisha 1990), “the rulers of Kosova” (Maliqi 
1989c), or “multi-national Kosovar bureaucracy”. (Kullashi 1989: 56) 
 63
The democrats argued that the Serb Communist elite was unable to resolve the sys-
temic crisis of real socialism. Therefore, it tried to postpone the democratisation of 
Yugoslavia by manipulating the nationalist feelings of the Serbs. (Magaš 1993; Kul-
lashi 1989, 1990; Maliqi 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1994; Surroi 1989a; Berisha 1990; 
Bobi 1994) Maliqi (1990b: 56) argued, “I still continue to think that the question is 
not in essence about an ethnic problem, but about a conflict stirred up by the leaders 
who, in order to maintain their power, have resorted to nationalism”. 
The democrats blamed Milošević for instigating the ethnic quarrels by creating to 
the Serbs a sense of victimisation, insecurity, and anxiety. (Kullashi 1989; Surroi 
1990b; Myrtezai et al. 1990; Maliqi 1989b, 1989c, 1989d, 1989e, 1990a, 1990b, 
1990c, 1998b; Bobi 1994) They considered Milošević as an adventurous, reactionary, 
power-obsessed Communist (Maliqi 1994: 56), who tried to “… consolidate the bu-
reaucratic structure of power” (Magaš 1993: 235), and used Kosovo “… as a wel-
comed cause to avoid the debate” about the fundamental political principles and the 
democratisation of Serbia and Yugoslavia. (Kullashi 1989: 53) 
The democrats dismissed the Serb propaganda about “Albanianization”, “counter-
revolution” or “genocide” as false. (Maliqi 1989a) “[The] relations between the Al-
banians and the Serbs today and in the past have been presented with a scheme… as 
‘a continuity of the multiple violence in which the former are regularly presented as 
aggressors and the latter as victims’. … The examples from history are selected… 
The events, the given circumstances, the activities of personalities, groups or institu-
tions are simplified, distorted, and sometimes even falsified”. (Kullashi 1989: 56) 
The democrats declared that the Serb nationalist propaganda was inspiring in-
creased oppression and even the expulsion of the Albanians out of Kosovo. Kullashi 
(1989: 61- 62) argued that Milošević was a threat to every Albanian because “The 
application of this wartime terminology in peaceful conditions expresses the attempt 
to apply the same measures indiscriminately against the external enemies and against 
those with a different or opposed political viewpoint. Time after time the Albanians 
of Kosova and of all other regions in Yugoslavia are presented both as internal and 
external enemies. … [The] only possible and very long delayed solution, ‘as the final 
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solution’ of the Kosova problem, is armed repression, military administration, the 
expulsion from Kosova of 300-400 thousand so-called ‘hostile migrants’”. 
The democrats represented themselves as impartial regarding their critique of na-
tionalist leaders. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 253) ridiculed Albanian “…village characters 
who have made their name by being more Albanian than the next man”. The democ-
rats warned against the nationalists who were trying to exploit the dissatisfaction of 
the Albanians and to escalate the conflict. Maliqi (1989a: 41) wrote, “They [the Al-
banian extremists] have achieved their aim: the Albanian extremists (just as the ex-
tremists of the other side) were hoping for years for this situation to arise”. 
However, the democrats made the difference between the Serb and the Albanian 
nationalism. The Serb nationalism was artificial and created from above, while the 
Albanian nationalism “… grew out of the discontent of the Albanian masses”. 
(Maliqi 1998b: 25) Surroi (Magaš 1993: 250-251) followed the same line and de-
scribed the founding of LDK as “… not so much a party as a product of the popular 
response to so many years of repression”. 
The democrats defended the nationalist reaction of the Albanians. Milošević 
scared them with the rehabilitation of Ranković and his anti-Albanian rhetoric. (Sur-
roi 1990b, 1998a; Maliqi 1989a, 1989e, 1990b, 1994; Kullashi 1995) Maliqi (Magaš 
1993: 183) excused the Albanian working class, “Milošević’s extreme Serb national-
ism made them [the Albanians] react not only as workers, but as Albanians, since 
they were being threatened and denounced as Albanians”. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 246) 
shared the same idea: “The violent anti-Albanian campaign has excluded Albanians 
from all political life, so that national frustration takes precedence over all other con-
cerns”.  
6.3 Democracy and self-determination 
The democrats declared “… first democracy, then the status of Kosovo”, i.e. the de-
mocratisation had priority to the resolution of the national question. (Maliqi 1998b: 
33) First, the democrats represented the East European democratisation and the Euro-
pean integration as pre-determined processes. Maliqi (1989c) wrote, “The democratic 
trend is our predetermined fate”. The future of Yugoslavia was democracy and EU 
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membership. Some years latter, Maliqi (1998b: 232) remembered, “We were engaged 
in the democratisation of Yugoslavia, for normal development”. 
Second, Kullashi (1995: 30) argued that the solution to the Yugoslav crisis was not 
nationalism, but a democratic and liberal society, “… where the freedom of the citi-
zen is the prerequisite to the freedom of the nation and not vice versa”. Surroi (1990a: 
25) represented such society as based on “… the sovereignty of the citizens”. Maliqi 
(1990b) rejected nationalism also, “The problem cannot be solved proceeding from 
the idea of the national state as a reality which has priority. … The way out is through 
democracy, a new concept of development and renunciation of nationalism”. Surroi 
(Magaš 1993: 251) argued likewise, “Kosovo’s problems go beyond the immediate 
problem of national oppression and can be tackled only on the basis of a transforma-
tion that would allow the free expression of all the different national, social and group 
interests throughout Yugoslavia”. The democrats expected that the democratisation 
was going to undermine the ethnic homogenisation. Ethnic differences would persist, 
but in a benign and rather controllable form. (Magaš 1993; Maliqi 1990b) 
Third, Kullashi warned that the nation-state was not necessary free and democ-
ratic. Nationalism was not above-ideology, but rather an ideology in itself, which 
gave priority to the nation and its collective rights. Therefore, just as Marxism, na-
tionalism, with its emphasis on the rights of the nation, could limit the rights of the 
individuals. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 253) agreed, “We do not wish to see a party-based 
monism replaced by one based on nationalism”. 
Forth, the democrats considered the nationalist agenda as dangerous because “… 
giving priority to the status of Kosovo was essentially a war option, which could 
postpone democratisation in Kosovo and even in Serbia”. (Maliqi 1998b: 34) Nation-
alism was unproductive because it was going to give Milošević a chance to mobilise 
the Serbs around the nationalist platform and further away from democratisation. 
(Kullashi 1989, 1990, 1995; Maliqi 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1989e, 1990b, 1994, 
1998b; Surroi 1989a, 1990b, 1998a; Magaš 1993) 
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6.4 The goal: the democratisation of Yugoslavia 
The definition of the problem and their understanding of the relation democracy-
nationalism determined the political goal of the democrats, formulated in “The Ap-
peal to the democratic opinion”24. First, the democrats declared that the only solution 
was the democratisation of Yugoslavia. (Kullashi 1989, Berisha 1990; Maliqi 1990b) 
Maliqi (1989c) wrote, “… the democratisation is the only road for the institutional 
establishment of a democratic order in Yugoslavia and to create the conditions for the 
elimination of those essential aspects of the crisis which have paralysed our system 
today”. Kullashi (1989: 63) called for “[The] limitation and control of the political 
power, the creation of premises for an effective functioning of the juridical state, for 
guaranteeing the independent activity of the courts, for political and cultural plural-
ism, for the autonomy of the society and the individual from the state”. 
Second, the democrats declared that the democratisation of Yugoslavia could not 
happen without the democratisation of Kosovo. Surroi (1990a) declared that, “The 
Kosova crisis, one of the most sensitive and specific components of the Yugoslav 
crisis, likewise, must find its solution in the establishment of democracy”. Kullashi 
(1990: 366) considered the democratisation of Kosovo as “… the greatest test for 
Yugoslavia… for democracy or for totalitarianism, for a civilized solution of the cri-
sis or for the continued repression”.  
Third, the democrats refrained from representing any demand about the future con-
stitutional status of Kosovo. (Kullashi 1989; Surroi 1989a, 1990a; Maliqi 1990c) 
Maliqi (1990b) wrote, “Even previously my opinion has been that the question of 
state organisation is of a second-rate importance as compared with the question of 
democratization”. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 253) demanded even “… a six-month armi-
stice on the issue of Kosovo” in order to neutralise the nationalists. The re-
arrangement of Yugoslavia and the political status of the Albanians were to be de-
cided after the democratic elections. Maliqi (Magaš 1993: 234) said that the Albani-
ans “… place their hope in the process of democratisation of Yugoslavia; in that con-
text, they will seek legal channels to achieve the return of a normal situation in Kos-
ovo”. 
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Forth, the democrats did not contemplate about the dissolution of Yugoslavia and 
an independent Kosovo. They could not imagine the dissolution of Yugoslavia. (Kul-
lashi 1989, 1990; Surroi 1989a, 1990a; Maliqi 1990c) Instead, the democrats spoke 
about the democratisation of Yugoslavia and its possible political and administrative 
re-arrangement. Kullashi (1990: 366) called for the “… re-construction of Yugoslavia 
as a federal union arranged as a representative system with the citizens as the main 
factor”. Surroi (Magaš 1993; Surroi 1989a, 1990a) was more concrete and proposed 
the organisation of Yugoslavia as a Federative state, parliamentary democracy, with a 
two-chamber parliament. The first chamber was to be elected through general and 
equal suffrage of all Yugoslav citizens, while the high chamber was to have an equal 
number of representatives from each unit. 
6.5 The strategy of the democratic fraction 
The democrats foresaw two scenarios regarding the democratisation of Yugoslavia. 
The first scenario was a democratic popular rebellion akin to the revolt that ousted 
Ceauşesću in Romania. (Surroi 1990b; Kullashi 1995) The democrats cheered the 
Romanian rebellion. They perceived it as bloodless and swift. However, they rejected 
immediately that this scenario could succeed in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. Surroi (Ma-
gaš 1993: 253) said, “However, despite the obvious parallels between Kosovo and 
Romania, we know that the situation in Yugoslavia is different; that direct confronta-
tion will not work”. Maliqi (Magaš 1993: 237) argued, “In the Albanian masses 
…there is a general will to resist, but at the present there is no means of coordinating 
this”. 
The democrats rejected any escalation of the situation. First, the moderates were 
influenced by the Polish and Czech experience. They considered Milošević as the last 
phase of the totalitarian Yugoslavia. (Maliqi 1994; Kullashi 1995) “Since their adver-
sary had chosen a totalitarian ideology and behaviour, the Albanians were happy to 
rely on the East European model of democratic counter-action that proved to be very 
efficient in the fight against totalitarianism”. (Maliqi 1998b: 28) Therefore, the de-
mocrats thought that violence was unnecessary and even dangerous, and called for 
political actions. Maliqi (1994: 38) reminisced some years latter, “The wave of de-
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mocratic changes … awakened the hope that the key to the solution of the problem of 
Kosovo and of the Albanian national question was democracy. The formula appeared 
to be quite simple: pluralism, market economy, free elections, multi-party parliament 
and democratic institutions … created space … for the declaration of free expression 
of the will of the Albanians and for the coming to power of the democratic majority 
in Kosova. There is no need to fight; it is enough to raise two fingers, the V-sign”. 
The democrats believed on a quick and decisive victory over the nationalists. 
Milošević was the last breath of the Communist oligarchy and a temporarily occur-
rence. (Maliqi 1994) Surroi (1989a) wrote, “I think this will not require more than a 
year”. 
Second, the democrats feared the Serb army and police. (Kullashi 1995; Surroi 
1989a, 1990a, 1990b; Shala 1990; Berisha 1990; Maliqi 1989d, 1989e, 1990a, 1990b, 
1990c, 1994; Clark 2000) Maliqi (1998b: 232) remembered, “Kullashi, as the Presi-
dent of the SDP25, had a heated debate at one joint meeting with Agani, claiming that 
if one accepts the path of escalation, that means opting for war. Agani was trying to 
neutralize that stand, saying that there is actually no danger of war”. Maliqi (1998b: 
234) wrote that the democrats knew how superior Yugoslavia/Serbia was militarily. 
Maliqi accepted that the military weakness was decisive as the Albanians opted for 
the civic resistance. “Especially with Albania in a state of collapse, Kosova Albanians 
thought themselves much too weak to start a war venture.” (Maliqi 1998b: 170) 
Third, the democrats believed that Milošević was trying to provoke the Albanians 
because he was looking for a military confrontation. (Surroi 1989a, 1990a, 1990b; 
Maliqi 1994, 1998b; Kullashi 1995) Maliqi (1994: 35) wrote, “The massacres with-
out any reason … the massive intoxication … the night encirclements and armed at-
tacks … are reasonably judged as attempts to induce a massive Albanian uprising, 
which could be used latter as casus belli and a reason for the bombardment of Alba-
nian settlements and massive reprisals to provoke an Albanian exodus”. Surroi (Ma-
gaš 1993: 246- 247) saw also a pattern of provocation, “… a conscious policy of try-
ing to provoke a national uprising… The Kosovo Party committee had sent a warning 
to the hospitals, even before the demonstrations began, that they should prepare 
themselves for a lot of casualties”. 
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Surroi (Magaš 1993: 246) labelled the organisers of the Albanian demonstrations 
as provocateurs working for Milošević. “There is evidence for this- that initially 
spontaneous [Albanian] demonstrations were in fact fanned by provocateurs”. 
Milošević would use their actions as an excuse “… ‘to correct’ the ethnic structure in 
favour of Serbs”. (Magaš 1993: 237) The democrats argued that the only right action 
was to avoid the Serb ploy and to do the opposite. (Maliqi 1989a, 1994, 1998b; Sur-
roi 1990b) Hence, Maliqi (1998b: 32) argued, “So the Albanian movement was 
obliged to take on an essentially fire-fighting role.” Therefore, “The non-violence 
strategy was imposed somehow by itself as a better answer, more pragmatic and effi-
cient to the Serb aggressive plans.” (Maliqi 1994: 37) 
Forth, the Serb propaganda accused the Albanians as being terrorists, separatists, 
Moslem fundamentalists, etc. Maliqi argued that the Albanians had to demonstrate to 
the international community that they were the opposite: European, democratic, mod-
ern, peaceful etc. (Maliqi 1994, 1998b) Maliqi (1998b: 103) wrote, “… the Albani-
ans, through their strategy of non-violence, rounded off their understanding and per-
ception of themselves as of good guys, i.e. benevolent, peaceful, and democratic peo-
ple as opposed to Serbs who were bad guys, i.e. belligerent and non-democratic peo-
ple”. 
Fifth, this strategy enjoyed the support of the EU and USA. Maliqi and others had 
a number of meetings with foreign diplomats, notably the US ambassador in Bel-
grade, Zimmerman. Zimmerman made it clear to Maliqi (1998b: 238) the Albanians 
should “… hold that course [civic resistance], not embark on an adventure, not to 
misunderstand some statements made by President Bush, or later, Clinton that Amer-
ica would intervene in the case of war. ‘That does not mean that you should start the 
war’”. 
The democrats realised that their direct influence in the masses was limited. 
(Maliqi 1989a, 1992e; Surroi 1990b) Therefore, they tried to do it indirectly by per-
suading the confused leadership of LDK which, “… it seemed, did not know what it 
wanted”. (Maliqi 1998b: 231) Maliqi (1992g) was very proud that they convinced 
Rugova (February 2, 1990) to stop the demonstrations and generally not to fall victim 
of Milošević’s provocations. 
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The democrats advocated the second scenario: the ousting of Milošević and the 
democratisation from above. The democrats believed that, “… there are other internal 
and external factors as well, that can reverse the situation and create the conditions 
for the application of the political means”. (Maliqi 1994: 70) The internal forces were 
the Federative institutions and the democratic forces in Yugoslavia. Surroi (1990a: 
84) wrote, “It seems to me that only the Federation can bring pluralism”. Maliqi em-
phasised the role of the democratic forces in Yugoslavia. “… the Serbian working 
class may appear momentarily blinded by the nationalist project, its future lies in co-
operation with the working class in other parts of the country”. (Magaš 1993: 238) 
The democrats prescribed a minimal role to the Albanian opposition. They called 
for the interruption of the demonstrations and strikes in order to prevent the first sce-
nario, and advocated the use of discussions, collective complains, and publications. 
As a model to the other parties, the moderates organised the signing of the petition 
“For Democracy-against Violence”26. (Surroi 1989a, 1990b; Berisha 1990; Maliqi 
1989d, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1994, 1998b; Clark 2000) Surroi (1990a) summarised, 
“We shall organise discussions on relevant social themes… we should send collective 
complaints to the highest organs in Kosova… we shall soon produce our own publi-
cations”. 
6.6 The conflict after the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
By the summer of 1990, the democrats began to doubt the future of Yugoslavia as a 
united and democratic country. (Maliqi 1990h) Maliqi (1998b: 122) wrote, “…the 
process of consolidation of democratic institutions will be particularly complex in 
federal states like the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which have al-
ready faced strong national, indeed nationalist, conflicts and separatist movements. 
Indeed, when these countries are concerned, we cannot be sure whether they will sur-
vive the process of democratisation as integral states or break up in smaller unites”. 
Nevertheless, the dissolution of Yugoslavia came as a surprise to the democrats. 
The democrats admitted that they failed to appreciate the ability of Milošević to play 
the nationalist card. Maliqi (1998b: 128) wrote, “I failed to predict one thing: the 
break up of Yugoslavia”. The dissolution of Yugoslavia forced the democrats to ac-
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knowledge that their programme of ‘democratic Yugoslavia’ had failed. Maliqi 
(1998b: 233) wrote, “We became losers, since our entire platform broke into pieces”. 
The democrats argued that the dissolution was caused primarily by the activity of 
the nationalistic leaders. The democrats criticised the Western scholars for using 
mono-causal ‘objective’ explanations for the dissolution of Yugoslavia, like historical 
animosities and absences, democratic immaturity, patriarchal values, or ethnocen-
trism. (Maliqi 1993b, 1993n; Bobi 1994; Kullashi 1995) 
Maliqi represented the new situation after the dissolution of Yugoslavia as apart-
heid and segregation. Maliqi (1994: 33, 34; 1998b: 24) blamed Milošević for creating 
“… a system, which has all the qualities of national apartheid and segregation… a 
relationship of open hate … in which one side stops at nothing, committing the most 
brutal violations of human rights and civil liberties”. The democrats argued that the 
goal of Milošević was not the annexation of Kosovo, but rather the creation of ‘the 
Great Serbia’ through expansion and ethnic cleansing. (Maliqi 1998b; Bobi 1994) 
Maliqi (1998b: 98- 99) wrote, “Militarization of the Kosova question is the doing of 
the present Serbian regime which does not even attempt to conceal that its ultimate 
aim is not only annexation, but also change in the ethnic structure of Kosova”. The 
democrats joined the other Albanian leaders and called Milošević an existential threat 
to the Albanians. (Maliqi 1998b; Kullashi 1995) Maliqi (1998b: 53) wrote, “Today, 
to be Albanian is to be in jeopardy: it is clearly our survival that is at stake”. Maliqi 
(1998b: 22) described the new political situation as “The division between Serbs and 
Albanians became total and confrontation became a way of life”. 
Maliqi (1994: 158) explained that the Albanians were forced to abandon the de-
mocratic project because “… the reality of the horrible national oppression forced us 
to put in the first place the Albanian national question, supporting completely the na-
tional liberation movement, its program for the independence of Kosovo from Serbia 
and the realisation of the right of self-determination of the citizens in Kosovo”. 
6.7 The goal of the Albanian movement 
Maliqi underlined he was pragmatic regarding the concrete political solution and 
open to debate different solutions regarding the relations between Serbia and Kosovo. 
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(Maliqi 1994, 1998b) The first option was the division of Kosovo and the exchange 
of territories and populations between Kosovo and Serbia. Maliqi (1998b) supported 
at first this idea, which according to him represented a clean and definitive break be-
tween the Albanians and the Serbs. Maliqi abandoned this option after a meeting with 
Sali Berisha, the then president of Albania. Maliqi was not convinced by Berisha that 
the division of Kosovo would lead to war. Nevertheless, Maliqi (1994: 117) rejected 
this option as “diabolical” because the Serb proposals demanded almost 40% of the 
territory of Kosovo, including the richest regions of Kosovo. Maliqi feared that a di-
vided Kosovo would remain a feeble state. 
The second option was the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. Maliqi argued that 
self-determination, i.e. independence, was the only right option to resolve the crisis. 
(Maliqi 1992d, 1994) Maliqi considered any connection with Serbia or the re-creation 
of Yugoslavia as impossible. Maliqi (1998b: 41) wrote, “Serious Albanian-Serb talks 
could be conducted in the first instance only on the issue of self-determination for 
Kosova, on how to give Kosova independence, and only secondarily on the eco-
nomic, political and other ties Kosova might have with Serbia.” 
Maliqi justified the demand for the independence of Kosovo with a number of ar-
guments. First, the co-existence with the Serbs was impossible because of their vio-
lence and refusal to accept the Albanians as equal. The majority of the Albanians had 
no positive experience as part of Serbia. Therefore, the Serbs had lost any right to 
govern the Albanians and Kosovo. Second, Maliqi argued that as any other colonial 
nation, the Albanians had the right to liberate itself politically. Third, the Albanians 
were not a minority, but a nation and as such, they had the right of self-determination. 
Maliqi did not debate the accuracy of the Serb historical right over Kosovo. He sim-
ply ignored it as irrelevant. (Kullashi 1995; Maliqi 1998b) 
Maliqi tried to elude the question about a future unification with Albania if the in-
dependence of Kosovo was recognised. “If the Albanians shall be unified or the solu-
tion shall be the independence of Kosovo, this has little importance”. (Maliqi 1994: 
183) Until 1992, Maliqi rejected any such possibility because of the Communist rule 
in Albania. (Maliqi 1994) However, in 1995, after a direct question, Maliqi (1998b: 
229) answered, “Whenever I was asked about my personal opinion, I would say that 
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the best solution would be the unification with Albania, and I will say that in every 
occasion. … I believe that the Albanians of Kosova would opt for the unification with 
Albania in a referendum, if they could freely express their will”. Maliqi (1998b) ex-
plained that he had rejected previously the idea of unification because of two reasons. 
First, Maliqi admitted that under the influence of the Serb propaganda, he had con-
sidered the unification as chauvinistic. Second, Maliqi rejected the unification be-
cause he feared that such a radical change of the balance of power could decrease the 
support of the European powers for the Albanians. However, by 1995, Maliqi con-
cluded that unification was ‘natural’ and not chauvinistic. 
By the middle of 1993, Maliqi called for a debate about the goal and strategy of 
the Albanian movement. Maliqi emphasised that debate was not betrayal, but a le-
gitimate and necessary part of a national-democratic movement. Maliqi (1994: 133) 
wrote, “We must open a continuous debate about this crucial matter about what is 
real and achievable at this moment and what should be postponed for latter”. Maliqi 
distanced himself form the other Albanian leaders who were failing to be realistic. 
The Albanian movement had to formulate a goal, which was achievable, and stop 
dreaming. “I am not one of those who project their wishes into some political con-
cepts, wishes that are perhaps illusory. I have always tried to be a realist”. (Maliqi 
1998b: 229) 
Maliqi declared that the solution of the question of Kosovo depended on the ac-
tions of three factors: the Serbs, Albanians, and the West. Maliqi (1998b: 38) dis-
missed any help from the Serb opposition because “As far as Kosova is concerned, 
there is unfortunately, still no Serb opposition”. No Serb political parties, able to de-
pose Milošević, recognised the right of self-determination to the Albanians in Kos-
ovo. Maliqi (1998b: 123) wrote, “The majority of the opposition parties … are no 
less nationalistic than the ruling party”. Surroi (1998a: 161) supported the same idea, 
“The main message which the ethnic Serbian politicians have projected until now is 
that Kosova is part of the territory of Serbia and will continue to be so”.  
The second factor was the activity of the Albanian movement. (Maliqi 1994, 
1998b) Maliqi was proud of the civic resistance that he considered both wise and pro-
ductive. Maliqi praised the civic resistance for saving the Albanians from the Serbs 
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massacres and increasing the international support for the question of Kosovo. “In 
reality, we are not mute. On the contrary, we have never been so clear and laud in 
expressing our goals and demands.” (Maliqi 1994: 66) The international community 
was showing more interests for the fate of the Albanians and Serbia was coming 
weakened from every “victory”. (Maliqi 1994: 150) However, Maliqi simultaneously 
admitted that albeit increasing international support, the civic resistance was not go-
ing to produce the independence of Kosovo. Maliqi (1994: 138) wrote, “The Serb 
forces cannot be thrown out of Kosovo through press conferences”. 
The third factor was the intervention of USA and EU. Maliqi believed that the 
European powers would play the decisive role in the solution of the Kosovo question. 
Maliqi (1998b: 75) was convinced that “Europe holds the keys to Kosova’s destiny… 
the EU considers it natural to assume the role of main arbiter”. However, Maliqi 
feared the egoism of different European states. Maliqi (1994: 28) regretted that the 
New World Order did not materialise as promised. “Yet no such order has been con-
structed, involving rules, relations of forces, and procedures based on documents of 
international law.” Europe continued to act according to the principles of the old or-
der: UK and France intended to control the German expansion rather than build a 
common foreign policy. Their foreign policy was built around old geo-strategic mod-
els. (Maliqi 1998p) “The French and the British still seem to believe in the old for-
mula of stability in the Balkans based on a powerful regional position of Belgrade 
and a kind of a political and military hegemony of the Serbs.” (Maliqi 1998b: 166) 
Maliqi dismissed any hope that the European powers were going to support the in-
dependence of Kosovo. Maliqi (1994: 45) explained that Europe was biased towards 
the right of self-determination because it “… has to conceal its past and even its 
criminal present”. The most influential European countries deliberated that if they 
recognised the right of self-determination to Kosovo, then they had to do the same 
with Corsicans, Catalans, etc. (Maliqi 1994, 1998b) They downgraded the question of 
Kosovo to an internal problem of Yugoslavia and advised its solution inside the 
scope of human rights. (Maliqi 1993b, 1994, 1998b) 
Therefore, the Albanians had two choices: to continue to remain in limbo, or to re-
frain from independence and aim at a compromise with Serbia. Maliqi opted for the 
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second solution. Maliqi (Clark 2000: 88) proposed to follow the international advice 
and to participate in the Serb elections with “… a list of independent citizen candi-
dates… [who would] go to the Serbian parliament with the programme for Kosovo 
independence”. Maliqi (1994: 160) recognised that participation in the elections was 
a heavy burden for the Albanians, “First to liberate our enemies, in order to be liber-
ated ourselves”. However, “… from the pragmatic point of view, participation in the 
Serbian elections might offer some advantages- it could be developed as a logical 
extension of the non-violence resistance strategy”. (Maliqi 1998b: 38) Further, if the 
Albanians boycotted the elections than Milošević should get 20% of the votes before 
the elections even began. (Maliqi 1998b) 
Maliqi’s call for debate was met with a harsh condemnation as political capitula-
tion and act of treachery. Maliqi (1998b: 230, 248) was labelled “Titoist”, “Serbian 
agent”, “Belgrade’s extended hand”, “Yugo-nostalgic”, etc. Maliqi expected a certain 
resistance to his declarations, but not a chorus of condemnation. Maliqi resigned from 
the duty of the chair of Social-Democratic Party, apologised, and swore his loyalty to 
independence and non-cooperation. Maliqi (1998b: 38) admitted that he was wrong. 
The participation in Serbian elections “… would represent a recognition of the Serbia 
fait accompli in Kosova, a denial of the right of self-determination, and a suicidal act 
in the face of the Serbian policy of assimilation and colonization”. 
6.8 The Dayton peace talks and the radicalisation of the 
Albanian movement 
The despair of the democrats during the Srebrenica massacres changed to optimism 
and euphoria during the Dayton talks. Maliqi declared, “... there are indicators that 
Kosova and Macedonia will come on the agenda immediately after the Dayton talks 
are over, so that time bombs are preventively dismantled”. (Maliqi 1998b: 136) 
The mode turned sour as the German foreign minister visited Belgrade and the 
European Union removed some of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. 
Moreover, Germany declared that it intended to return the Albanian refugees. (Maliqi 
1998b; Surroi 1998b) Maliqi (1998b: 150) wrote, “The international community’s 
hesitation in dealing with the Kosova issue has deeply disappointed Kosova Albani-
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ans. Its promises that Kosova will be a priority concern of preventive diplomacy now 
strike them as if they have always been and still are hollow words. … The contradic-
tory policy that the West pursues in relation to Belgrade is not encouraging”. The 
democrats complained that the international disengagement had disappointed the Al-
banians. Maliqi (1998b: 153) admitted, “The recent developments have dispelled Al-
banian illusions that the resolution for Kosova would arrive from abroad”. 
The democrats complained that USA and EU were not paying attention to the fate 
of the Albanians because there was no fighting in Kosovo. (Maliqi 1998j; Surroi 
1998c) Maliqi (1998b: 141) wrote, “The most cynical ones [foreign diplomats] 
among them even say ‘It is necessary to wage war for what you demand’. In other 
words, they believe that the Serbs in Bosnia have won the right to have their own re-
public by war, while the Albanians who have not waged war can count only on a 
somewhat lower degree of autonomy”. Maliqi argued that with its policy, the West 
was sending all the wrong signals and helping the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 
“The Dayton agreement was a regional watershed, enshrining the ethnic principle 
within Bosnian politics and suggesting that violence could succeed in winning inter-
national support”. (Maliqi 1998b: 190) 
Maliqi considered the KLA as the Albanian answer to the lessons of the Dayton 
agreement and the lack of international intervention. Maliqi (1998d, 1998e) was bi-
ased regarding the activity of the KLA. He did not challenge the goal, or the morality 
of the actions of the KLA, but rather its effectiveness. Maliqi (1998b: 185) wrote, 
“Guerrilla actions have been mounted against the Serbian police but the KLA does 
not seem to represent a crucial factor that could substantially change the balance of 
power”. On the other side, the KLA could draw the attention of the international 
community. However, the democrats feared that, as in Bosnia, the international help 
would arrive too late to save the Albanians. The Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnia terri-
fied the democrats and they thought that KLA was providing Milošević with an ex-
cellent opportunity in Kosovo. (Maliqi 1998d, 1998e, 1998f, 1998g, 1998h, 1998j, 
1998o, 1998q, 1998r; Surroi 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Shala 1998a) “The spectre is of 
Milosevic provoking a widespread Albanian uprising, and then war, to justify ethnic 
cleansing.” (Maliqi 1998b: 191) 
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Therefore, fearing a massacre of Bosnia proportions, the democrats concentrated 
their efforts in two directions. First, Maliqi attacked openly the policy followed by 
Rugova. “During the last years in Kosova, we, consequently, had politics that was 
blinded by its own naivety and futility, with a continuous tendency toward atrophy, 
by a created illusion that the solution will come by itself, on one side, and on the 
other yet another comparable unrealistic politics, blinded by its aggressiveness in re-
lation to the prevailing atrophy, as well as by its position of ignorance toward the 
world.” (Maliqi 1998s) 
The democrats believed that the renunciation of the act of independence by 
Rugova was going to increase the chances of the Western intervention in Kosovo. 
Rugova, “… the leader of Kosova Albanians is aware that for the time being the op-
tion of independent Kosova had failed to win the support of the international com-
munity, even of Americans, and that a compromise should be sought for coexistence 
with the Serbs, no matter how impossible it may seem from the present vantage 
point”. (Maliqi 1998b: 154) The democrats were confident that Rugova knew he had 
to renounce the act of independence and accept the position of the international com-
munity. Maliqi (1998b: 153) wrote, “[Rugova]… has finally realised that it was im-
possible to seek solution outside that framework, but he still lacks the courage to face 
the Albanian public with it”. 
Maliqi (1998b: 186) foresaw one solution: “The most rational and least painful 
would be the application of a partial, rather than a conclusive solution. This would be 
based on the division of power, a kind of extension of the current state of dual power 
and parallel life, but under agreed conditions”. The democrats recognised the resis-
tance between the Albanians for any solution less than independence. However, they 
were confident that, “...when the time comes, it will be possible to win people 
around, ‘if Rugova says, every day, “This is what we must do”’”. (Judah 1998: 38) 
The second direction was to call upon the USA and EU to intervene and unblock 
the political situation. (Maliqi 1998b, 1998e, 1998k, 1998m, 1998n; Shala 1998e, 
1998g, 1998h; Surroi 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999a, 1999b) “The fate of our sover-
eignty is obviously determined by the hope on the support of our foreign friends, first 
of all the United States.” (Maliqi 1998m) The democrats argued that neither 
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Milošević nor Rugova could find a compromise on their own. Surroi (1999a) called 
for, “an imposition of an accord”. The USA and EU had to impose an agreement ex-
actly as in Bosnia. Shala (Kovacic 1997) said, “It is the international community 
which must slap the deal down at the table like in Dayton”. Maliqi arrived at the same 
conclusion. “Once the interim agreement is signed, even though there will be shared 
dissatisfaction, it is assumed that the presence of the international factor would be 
sufficient for the quick implementation of the solution.” (Maliqi 1998u) 
6.9 Summary 
The democrats believed that Yugoslavia was experiencing the systemic crisis of 
Communism. It was a conflict between the dogmatic (real) socialism and the democ-
ratic socialism. Therefore, their solution was the democratisation of Yugoslavia 
through democratic means. The democrats believed that democratisation was a neces-
sary process and that a democratic society could resolve all the other problems, in-
cluding the national question. 
The democrats denied that there was an ethnic conflict between the Serbs and the 
Albanians. Milošević and the Serb Communist leadership manipulated the conflict 
between the Albanians and the Serbs. Milošević was facing increasing demands for 
the democratisation of Serbia and he used Kosovo to divert the anger/disappointment 
of the working class to nationalism. The Albanians were not guilty because they were 
not the cause of the Serb nationalism. On the contrary, the Albanian nationalist mobi-
lisation was a direct consequence of the Serb nationalism and aggressive policies ini-
tiated by Milošević. The Albanians were trying to defend their political and social 
rights and even their existence. 
The democrats proposed the civic resistance as the only possible way to resist to 
Milošević and achieve the democratisation of Yugoslavia. The democrats proposed 
this strategy for three main reasons. First, they intended to democratise Yugoslavia 
through democratic means, like in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The democrats be-
lieved that these means were going to work in Yugoslavia also. Second, the democ-
rats perceived the Serb massacres as an attempt to provoke an Albanian armed re-
sponse. The democrats believed that Milošević was looking for an opportunity to re-
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solve the Albanian question swiftly through massacres and expulsions. Therefore, the 
democrats perceived as their duty to formulate a new strategy of resistance to evade 
the war and save the nation. Third, the international community was supporting this 
strategy. The Albanian civic resistance was intended to buy time until the Yugoslav 
democratic forces and the international community removed Milošević from power. 
The democrats accepted that the dissolution of Yugoslavia caught them by sur-
prise. The democrats argued that the main culprit for the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
was Milošević. His attempts to centralise Yugoslavia produced the Slovenian and 
Croat secessionism. His following efforts to create the Great Serbia through the re-
drawing of the borders and ethnic cleansing plunged the entire country into a horrible 
ethnic war. The democrats depicted the relationship between the Serbs and the Alba-
nians as apartheid, open hate, and violence. The Albanian demand for independence 
was right and justified because the Albanians in Kosovo had the right of self-
determination. 
The democrats considered unnecessary the formulation of a new strategy after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. The democrats considered the wars in Croatia and Bosnia 
as evidence that their predictions were right. Serbia was militarily strong and 
Milošević was willing to commit atrocities to create the Great Serbia. The democrats 
believed that the solution could only come through the actions of a third party: the 
help and the support of the USA and EU. 
The democrats argued that the Albanian political parties had to take into account 
the intentions of the Western powers. The Albanians had to settle for less than inde-
pendence, not because their demand was false, but because they could not achieve it. 
The democrats believed that neither the Albanian resistance nor the unyielding de-
mand for independence could influence the Western powers to change their stance 
towards the independence of Kosovo. On the contrary, if the Albanians renounced the 
act of independence and settled in principle for autonomy inside Serbia/Yugoslavia, 
than the international could act more decisively in their support. Maliqi tried to de-
bated about the goal of the Albanian movement, only to be surprised at the harsh con-
demnation that he received by LDK. 
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The democrats explained the Albanian armed resistance as the logical conclusion 
of the Dayton agreement, the removal of external wall of sanctions against Serbia, 
and the lack of a strong involvement by the EU and USA. However, the democrats 
did not support the actions of KLA because they were giving to Milošević the casus 
belli to unleash all his military power against the Albanians. The democrats feared the 
huge losses Milošević would inflict upon the Albanians if the Western help would 
take time to materialise like in Bosnia. The democrats were not prepared to accept 
these losses and thought that victory would meaningless if paid with the blood of Al-
banian civilians. 
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7. REXHEP QOSJA, HIS POLITICAL IDEAS 
7.1 Qosja and his self-image 
Qosja (1996) was born in an all-Albanian village27 annexed by Montenegro in 1880, 
after fierce battles between the volunteers of the Albanian League of Prizreni and the 
Montenegrin army. Qosja (1996: 450) confessed that his strongest impression from 
his childhood related to the interaction between the Albanians and the Serbs: a young 
man who ended up mentally ill because of Serb torture. Qosja, according to his own 
statements, neither had nor tried to get any Montenegrin or Serb friend. After he 
graduated from the University of Prishtina28, Qosja joined the Albanological Institute. 
Qosja (1990: 181) perceived his research as a major contribution29 to both science 
and patriotism, because “… the Albanian literature of the National Renaissance was 
not only literature, but our national ideology as well”. 
Qosja (1990: 25) declared that he got involved in politics because of his loyalty 
and responsibility to the nation “… as a reaction: to the unjust and anti-historical pol-
icy of Yugoslavia, of course, dictated by Serbia”. Qosja rejected the notion ‘the father 
of the nation’ or any resemblance to Dobrica Ćosić, the leading Serb nationalist ideo-
logue. However, Qosja emphasised that he was the first Albanian intellectual to call 
for the republic of Kosovo, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the unification with 
Albania. 
Qosja (1990, 1994) declared that he disliked politics: dirty and dishonest; and that 
he was suspicious of the politicians: egoistic and short-sighted. Therefore, Qosja re-
fused to lead the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and preferred to continue his 
activity as an independent intellectual. Qosja assigned to himself this role: the protec-
tor of the nation, above the political parties, incorruptible and unselfish. Qosja (1992: 
13) had a Plato-a-like understanding of the role of the intellectuals. “The intellectuals 
constitute that social stratum that formulates the democratic and national demands, 
while the youth is, primarily, the force that strives to realise those”. Qosja (1990, 
1992, 1994) envisaged that, his role was to contemplate, formulate ideas, and estab-
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lish goals. His only concrete action was the organisation of the Democratic Union of 
Kosovo in June 1998 as a political alternative to Rugova. Qosja (1992) believed that 
‘the soldiers’ were going to organise themselves and resist to the Serb aggression. 
7.2 The victimisation of the Albanians by Serbia 
Qosja (1992: 81) emphasised the necessity to analyse the historical past. “It is well-
known that we can judge reasonably the prospect for the future only based on the 
facts and knowledge of the past”. Qosja (1990, 1992, 1994) depicted the Albanian 
history as an antithesis: the Albanian nation, although innocent, was the most suf-
fered and victimised nation in Europe. The Albanian nation was innocent because, 
“… [It] has never enslaved someone else, occupied, or harmed another nation”. 
(Qosja 1990: 176) Nevertheless, the Albanians were victims, because “The European 
and Balkan historical-political circumstances have caused great historical, national, 
political, and social injustices to the Albanians as a nation … the only nation in Bal-
kan, and probably the only nation in Europe, which the historical injustice has con-
demned to live divided in five states.” (Qosja 1990: 210) 
Three factors caused the victimisation of the Albanians. The first one was the Ot-
toman occupation and Islamisation. Qosja (1992: 7, 9) regretted that “Although, geo-
graphically part of Europe, historically it [the Albanian nation] was for a long time 
part of Asia … The Ottoman Empire built a wall between the Albanians and Europe, 
first of all with Islam as its state ideology, but not only that.” 
Second, Qosja (1990, 1992, 1994) condemned the European Great Powers, which 
pursued an egoistic, dishonest, and unjust policy because of geo-political considera-
tions. Qosja (1996: 218) quoted Metternich30: “Europe does not need freedom, but 
peace”. Qosja (1992: 16, 28) claimed that the imperialistic European powers were 
guilty because they “… actively participated in the most significant national drama in 
their continent- the division of the Albanian territories … using the rights and the fate 
of small nations like banknotes”. 
Third, (and the main cause) the Albanians were victims of the colonial, chauvinis-
tic, and expansionist policy of Serbia. Qosja (1990, 1992, 1994) repeated that the 
Serb bourgeoisie fabricated the historical right over Kosovo out of some medieval 
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legends to justify the occupation and the subsequent colonisation of Kosovo. The 
myth of Kosovo inspired a constant colonial and racist policy towards the Albanians: 
a catalogue of massacres, oppression, exploitation, and expulsions. 
Qosja (1990: 11) maintained that the Albanians were still victims of Serbia be-
cause of their unequal political status as “the forbidden nation”. “Indeed, the Alba-
nian nation … has not experienced yet the real liberty”. (Qosja 1990: 98) Qosja 
(1990, 1992, 1994) explained that the Albanians remained the poorest, most ne-
glected, and undeveloped nation in Yugoslavia, although they lived in one of its rich-
est areas. Qosja (1990: 360) denounced the Serb intimidation and persecution of the 
Albanians as an effort to prolong the unequal political situation and the exploitation 
of Kosovo. “The police are the symbol of the reality in Kosovo. Serbia- it is the Po-
lice for the Albanians. The police, the Serb police are the destiny of the Albanians. 
Cursed fate!” Qosja (1990: 367) declared, “The Serb policy towards the Albanians, 
incessant since 1912, is the policy of repression, which without reluctance uses state 
force and violence against them”. 
Qosja (1990, 1992) believed that the election of Milošević as chair of the League 
of Communists of Serbia, and the policy that he was pursuing, represented an existen-
tial threat against every Albanian and the Albanian nation. The abolishment of the 
autonomy was the prologue of the final solution of the Albanian question. Qosja 
(1990: 231, 254) wrote, “Now, for the third time during the twentieth century, we are 
in the historic situation in which our fate and future shall be decided… The Albani-
ans, today, are afraid for their fate, for the fate of their families, for their employment, 
for their dignity, for their safety, for their liberty and future… our life, as it is shown 
during the last days, is completely worthless to the police and army”. 
7.3 Ethnic conflict as elite manipulation 
Qosja denied that there was a conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs. Qosja 
(1990) maintained that the ethnic conflicts were not objective, genuine, or predeter-
mined, but rather artificial events constructed by the bourgeoisie. Peaceful ethnic co-
existence was possible, based on equality, mutual respect, and human understanding. 
Qosja (1990: 290) wrote, “Divisions, rifts are abnormal conditions in the life of na-
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tions and peoples. Only peace and solidarity are the natural state of humanity- the 
natural state in the life of nations”. 
Qosja (1990: 341) did not blame the Serbs because “… the nation cannot be 
equated with its ruling stratum”. Instead, Qosja accused Milošević for inventing the 
conflict to prolong his own rule, to the detriment of both the Albanians and the Serbs. 
Qosja (1990: 290-291) declared, “I do not think there is a rift between the nations in 
Kosovo. I think there is a rift between the nations and the power-holders … The rul-
ers try to break the equality of the nations, because in this manner they succeed to 
prolong their rule. This is the political logic pursued by the present Serb leadership”. 
Milošević, the Serb nationalist intelligentsia, and the Serb media colluded to manipu-
late the latent distrust and prejudices of the Serbs to hate and aggressiveness against 
the Albanians and away from the democratisation. Qosja concentrated his efforts in 
contesting the Serb nationalist intelligentsia. The Serb intellectuals compiled the new 
nationalist and anti-democratic programme, “a new mythology about Kosovo, but 
this time, a mythology, in which, the villains, instead of the Turks, were the Albani-
ans”. (Qosja 1990: 12) Qosja (1990: 210) regretted that Milošević succeeded in turn-
ing Serbia into “… a society in which the nationalist explosions act as a substitute for 
democracy”. 
Qosja (1990, 1992) maintained that the Albanians were innocent because they did 
nothing to provoke or aggravate the conflict. The root of the conflict was not the de-
mand for the Republic of Kosovo, because this demand was ‘natural’ and ‘just’. “It is 
not necessary to remember you how natural, just and moral are the endeavours of 
every nation to establish the right of self-determination- because only in that way, it 
can exercise its own freedom; to have its own state- because only in this way, it can 
protect its own destiny; to live in democracy- because only in this way, it can fully 
develop its own creativity.” (Qosja 1990: 178) Qosja dismissed any claim that the 
Republic of Kosovo would impair the national or religious rights of the Serb in Kos-
ovo or in Serbia. The status of Republic was going to guarantee equal national rights 
to both the Albanians and the Serbs. 
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7.4 Social progress, self-determination and democracy 
Qosja (1990, 1992) depicted the social progress as a necessary, logical, natural move-
ment towards more freedom and equality, individual freedom (democracy) and col-
lective freedom (self-determination). Qosja (1990: 262) wrote, “… humanity is mov-
ing increasingly more secure towards increasingly broader rights and liberties for the 
individual and the nations, towards the true equality between the nations”. However, 
self-determination had priority over democracy because the collective rights consti-
tuted the base for the individual rights. Qosja (1990: 291) explained, “Democracy 
implies freedom and equality of nations and individuals. Without equality of nations 
in multinational communities, there can be no equality of citizens”. Qosja (1990: 
157) argued explicitly that the Albanians as individuals could become equal citizens 
only if the Albanian nation was politically equal to the other Yugoslav nations. Qosja 
was clear: first, the national emancipation, i.e. the Republic of Kosovo and latter the 
democratisation of Kosovo and Yugoslavia. 
Qosja claimed that the Albanians were progressive and bound to win because they 
were demanding more equality and freedom. The Serb leadership was anti-
democratic and regressive because it was trying to stop the social progress through 
violence. Qosja (1990: 231) declared, “We should not get desperate. The history does 
not develop in a straight line”. However, Qosja declared that the annulment of auton-
omy of Kosovo was a pause to gather forces and move to a higher social understand-
ing or level. 
Marxist determinism influenced likewise the understanding of the Serb violence 
and its consequences. Qosja (1990: 284) wrote, “…through violence, one question 
cannot be resolved and has never been resolved: the national question. Violence can 
only postpone for a certain time the right solution of the national question”. 
Milošević was only a brief setback and unable to change the predestined course of 
social progress. Qosja (1990: 242) expressed his confidence, “The crisis is going to 
pass, the violence is going to come to its end, and the hate is going to pass. The lead-
ers of national and religious intolerance (Milošević and his team) are going to pass 
and new forces shall emerge necessarily- the forces of civil and democratic toler-
ance”. 
 86 
7.5 The republic of Kosovo vs. the Albanian unification 
Qosja did not blame the Serbs as a nation, but rather the Serb elite for creating the 
conflict in order to postpone the democratisation of Yugoslavia. However, the goal of 
the Albanian movement, as Qosja envisaged it, was not the deposing of Milošević 
and the democratisation of Serbia/Yugoslavia, but the Republic of Kosovo inside 
Yugoslavia. First, Qosja (1990, 1992, 1994) argued that the Republic of Kosovo was 
a rightful demand that did not depend on the regime form in Serbia, but on certain 
objective qualities of the concerned national group (i.e. the Albanians). The Albani-
ans were a nation and possessed the right of self-determination because they fulfilled 
all the conditions: distinct national identity, territory, population, and political will. 
Qosja (1990: 269- 270) wrote, “The Albanians in Yugoslavia … even because of 
their number compared to the other nations in Yugoslavia, or as the majority in Kos-
ovo, or because of their spiritual and cultural development and the level of develop-
ment of their national conscience, are objectively a nation: that lives together, in a 
compact territory, as its most ancient autochthon nation”.  
Second, Qosja (1990, 1992) implied that even a democratic Serbia was going to 
remain an ethnocracy and treat the Albanians as second rank citizens. Qosja (1990: 
159) argued that autonomy had proven to be unstable and reversible like “… a very 
sensible plant that the winds from Belgrade can toss in the ground”. Only the Repub-
lic of Kosovo, equal to the other Yugoslav units, could guarantee the equality and 
eliminate the vulnerability to the Serb political mood. Qosja (1990: 370) ridiculed 
any Albanian “… who instead of the Republic of Kosovo chooses autonomy, [he] 
reminds us of an abnormal human who, instead of a large and strong castle, in which 
he was going to be the landlord, would choose to live in a rotten hut, from which he 
can be thrown out at any time”. 
Simultaneously, Qosja (1990, 1992) aired the idea of the national unification of all 
the Albanians in one national state: the ideal solution and his personal lifelong dream. 
Qosja (1992: 98) wrote that, “… the unification of the Albanian nation is the holy 
ideal of the Albanian nation. Such will is a natural right”. Qosja (1990, 1992) felt so 
strong that he debated unification, although he considered it impossible. First, Qosja 
implied that the unification was not desirable for as long as Albania remained a 
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Communist dictatorship. Second, Qosja could not conceive the dissolution of Yugo-
slavia. Qosja considered a regime change in Albania as imminent while the dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia remained unthinkable. Therefore, Qosja consoled himself with the 
idea of the unified Albanian nation inside the EEC. “The Albanians are right to hope 
that their question can be resolved entirely and not partly, once and for all and not 
temporarily, in the united Europe of the free nations, because in the Europe of na-
tions, they as a divided nation would realise unification”. (Qosja 1992: 25) 
7.6 The strategy of the Albanian movement 
Qosja (1990, 1992) argued that two forces were going to produce the desired political 
results. The first and the decisive force was the Albanian peaceful, but active resis-
tance: demonstrations, strikes, etc. Qosja challenged directly the policy advocated by 
Rugova and Maliqi. Qosja (1990: 379) wrote, “No! I don’t think that through 
Ghandi-a-like passive resistance it can be done a lot to weaken the reign of the Serb 
violence in Kosovo”. Qosja contested the idea of Maliqi and Rugova that Serbia was 
going to use any act of resistance as en excuse for new massacres. Qosja (1992) was 
convinced that the level of violence did not depend on the level of the Albanian resis-
tance, but rather it depended on the goal of Serbia: the expulsion of the Albanians 
from Kosovo. 
However, Qosja (1990: 368) excluded any armed action against the Serb rule. “In 
peace, nevertheless, and only in peace, we should search the resolution of the ques-
tion of Kosovo and the Albanian question”. Qosja argued that the goal of the Albani-
ans was to live in peace with their neighbours, while violence was going to bring pain 
and sufferings to all the nations in Kosovo. “I stand for the peaceful solution of the 
question of Kosovo because I am conscious that force and violence cause pain and 
misfortune to all people- guilty and innocent as well.” (Qosja 1990: 373) 
Qosja argued that Milošević was not going to relinquish willingly his control over 
Kosovo. Qosja (1990: 209) wrote, “History does not record any ruling stratum that 
has refrained willingly from power, which has refrained willingly from its own inter-
ests, therefore, we cannot expect that the ruling stratum in Yugoslavia was going to 
be an exception”. Therefore, Qosja (1990, 1992) recommended the active resistance 
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albeit he acknowledged that his strategy was painful and risky. Qosja had an espe-
cially national-romantic idea about the effect of violence: violence produces pain, but 
pain strengthens the nation. Qosja (1990: 263, 318) wrote, “Fortunately, because of 
these pains, no nation has disappeared. On the contrary, the nations are hardened in 
pain, both spiritually and morally. … The violence hurts the nations temporarily, but 
in their historical development, it strengthens their vitality”. Qosja could not even 
imagine a painless victory. “Because [the nations] do not achieve their freedom, 
walking through flowers, but only through prolonged ordeals and pains”. (Qosja 
1990: 337) 
The second factor was the intervention of the international community. Qosja’s 
language revealed his belief on the new nature of the international relations: a para-
digm change had happened in the world. “In the world, in the meantime, today is un-
der articulation a new political philosophy that encourages inter-relations, agree-
ments, equality of nations, which upholds freedoms, rights and their sovereignty”. 
(Qosja 1990: 231) Qosja used the notion ‘the Great Powers’ when he referred to the 
role of the Western powers as they divided the Albanian territories between their 
Balkan clients. Qosja (1992: 28) accused the imperialistic Europe for “… using the 
rights and the fate of small nations instead of banknotes”. In contrast, Qosja used the 
notion ‘the international community’ to refer to the role of EU and USA in resolving 
the Albanian question in 1989-1991. The new world, as Qosja understood it, was the 
political and ideological antithesis of the old imperialistic Europe. “Although in the 
minds of many, the name of Europe is associated with the Great Powers… Europe of 
after the World War II is neither politically, legally, nor morally, the Europe of before 
World War II. … Europe… is looking upon us and is protecting us.” (Qosja 1992: 19, 
21) 
Qosja (1990, 1992, 1996) believed that the new Europe was going to help actively 
the Albanians to achieve their self-determination. First, Qosja was convinced that the 
new Europe recognised its old mistakes and felt morally obliged to help the Albanian 
democratic movement. “Europe that draw the political map of the Balkan, creating 
the Albanian question, as the tragic question of the Balkan is now, historically and 
morally obliged to help for the just resolution of this question. And not only Europe, 
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but even the USA, that now is the symbol of democracy and universal justice.” 
(Qosja 1990: 391) Second, Qosja (1990, 1992) assumed that the European Commu-
nity intended to expand and include the Balkan states as well. Therefore, Qosja ex-
pected that EEC was going to intervene actively in the democratisation of Yugosla-
via. 
7.7 The Yugoslav dissolution: occupation vs. liberation 
Qosja (1992, 1994, 1996) declared that the dissolution of Yugoslavia represented a 
complete new situation that demanded a new language and a new understanding. 
Qosja (1996: 46, 1994:249) claimed that Yugoslavia was “a mistake of history” and 
“a creature against the nature”. It was not created by the free will of its comprising 
nations, but because of imperialistic interests of France and England. 
Qosja described the dissolution of Yugoslavia not as an accident, but rather as the 
unavoidable and necessary result of the historical progress. Qosja (1994: 249, 246, 
311) summarised that, “Yugoslavia was a creature ‘against the nature’… The dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia is the product … of the liberation efforts of its comprising na-
tions”, because “It [Yugoslavia] did not represent the right solution of the national 
question of its comprising nations”. However, the cause of the ethnic violence was 
not the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but rather the policy of Milošević. Qosja (1996: 
153) declared, “I am convinced that the main reason for the war in the former Yugo-
slavia is the policy of Slobodan Milošević”. 
The conflict was no longer between the Serb elite and the nations. Already on July 
5th, 199031 Qosja (1990: 364) had ‘mentioned’, “At the present, the Albanian rule 
over Kosovo, inexistent as it was, is even officially declared inexistent! Kosovo is 
under Serb occupation!” In January-February 1991, Qosja (1992: 83) wrote an article 
titled “The Albanians in Yugoslavia- an occupied nation” that became the pivot of his 
political narrative. The conflict was between the occupier colonial Serbia and the oc-
cupied Kosovo. Qosja (FISH 1995) wrote, “The Serb interest in Kosovo is simply 
colonialist and hegemonic, while the Albanian interest is ethnic and existential”. 
Qosja (1992: 124) described the occupation, as “… the most tragic condition that a 
nation can experience; the freedom and the independence are the highest ideal that a 
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nation can aim to achieve”. Qosja (1994) argued that the final goal of Serbia was not 
to control Kosovo, but to expulse all the Albanians from their land. “The chauvinistic 
occupying Serb regime does not know where to stop: because hate is its only senti-
ment; because terror is its method; because our disappearance from our land is its 
ultimate goal!” (Qosja 1992: 140) 
Qosja erased slowly the distinction between Milošević/Serbia and the Serbs living 
in Kosovo. “Even the Serbs and the Montenegrins in Kosova, are armed by Serbia up 
to their teeth”. (Qosja 1996: 95) The Serbs were no longer ‘the manipulated’, but the 
colonial masters and their duty was to impose Serbia’s domination over Kosovo and 
oppress the Albanians. Qosja (1996: 368, 95) wrote, “Around 2 million Albanians are 
completely ruled, exploited and oppressed by some 150000 Serbs and Montene-
grins… armed by Serbia up to their teeth”. Kosovo was a colony of Serbia where 
“One ethnic minority- the Serb minority rules, exploits, and persecute the majority- 
the Albanian majority”. (Qosja 1996: 375) 
7.8 The Albanian unification 
Qosja had no doubt about the future of the Albanians in the Great Serbia and com-
pared it to the period before the WWII. The Albanians “… were going to submit to 
recurring expulsions, but this time this process will be concluded”. (Qosja 1992: 144) 
However, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was not only a huge setback, but also a 
unique opportunity for the resolution of the Albanian question. “The dissolution of 
Yugoslavia has opened the historically unstoppable process … of the creation of the 
new national states”. (Qosja 1994: 251) Qosja (1994: 251) argued that the Albanians 
had to make the maximum efforts to exploit this chance, because “Now, or probably 
never ever!” 
Qosja (1992, 1994, 1996) excluded any ties between Kosovo and Ser-
bia/Yugoslavia. “Yugoslavia as a federation is a closed chapter.” (Magnussen 
1998:6) Qosja declared that the only right and long-term solution was the national 
state that respected the ethnic geographical boundaries. Qosja discerned between the 
Albanian question and the question of Kosovo. “The Albanian question cannot be 
reduced to the question of Kosovo, even though Kosovo is its most important element 
 91
… Any comprehensive solution to the Albanian question must take the problem of all 
these Albanians into account” (Qosja 1995b: 494-495) 
However, Qosja was forced to retreat from the idea of unifying all the territories 
with an Albanian majority and instead to concentrate on the unification of Albania 
and Kosovo. First, the international community granted recognition to Macedonia 
and Montenegro. Second, the Albanian political parties in these two republics de-
clined to support his idea. Qosja (1992, 1994) was especially disappointed with the 
Albanians leaders in Macedonia that opted for a solution inside Macedonia and did 
not mention the idea of unification. 
Therefore, Qosja downgraded his demand and called for the unification of Albania 
and Kosovo. “The unification of the Albanians- this is the future necessary to come.” 
(Qosja 1992: 85) Qosja argued that unification was a necessary and unstoppable 
process. Qosja (1992: back-cover note) claimed “And, the day of the destruction of 
that wall [the border that divided the Albanians] would come as a necessity of his-
tory. And, the day of Albanian unification would come as a necessity of justice”. 
Qosja (1994, 1996) claimed that the Albanian case was unique. Qosja argued that 
the Albanians in Kosovo were not a minority, but the only divided nation. Qosja 
(FISH 1995) wrote, “The Albanians have been referred to as a minority, although 
constituting half of the entire [Albanian] nation… The Albanian question cannot be 
treated as a minority question in the Serbian-Montenegrin Federation either, since 
Albanians are more numerous than Montenegrins that constitute only 5% of this fed-
eration, and yet have their own republic, whereas Albanians constitute 16.6% in the 
federation or 1/3 of the population of multinational Serbia”. 
Therefore, the Albanian question demanded a unique solution: the unification of 
Kosovo and Albania. First, Qosja (1992, 1994, 1996) argued that the Albanians pos-
sessed the ‘will’ to live in their unified state. Qosja described ‘the will of the nation’ 
to create his own national state as innate, legitimate, progressive, and as obvious as it 
needed no explanation. “The Albanian nation has one ideal: the national unification.” 
(Qosja 1996: 8) Qosja declared that the German unification was the best evidence to 
the existence and the force of ‘the will of the nations’. Second, Qosja (1992) main-
tained that the Albanians in Kosovo were autochthones and the majority in Kosovo. 
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As such, they had a special connection to Kosovo and the special right to decide 
about its political status. Third, because of its violent past, “Serbia has lost every 
moral and political right to govern Kosovo or to have any institutional connection 
with”. (Qosja 1999: 111) 
7.9 The strategy of the Albanian movement 
Qosja argued that three factors were determining the solution of the Albanian ques-
tion. “The Albanians … are the main factor that shall decide the way to resolve it [the 
Albanian national question]; Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, as republics in 
which the Albanians are oppressed and exploited, are the second factor interested 
about the Albanian question, but interested to preserve status quo, … the European 
and world political factor is the third factor”. (Qosja 1992: 89) 
The first factor was the role of Milošević and the Serb opposition. Qosja regretted 
that Milošević had already succeeded in scaring Rugova and achieved his goal. Qosja 
(1994, 1996, 1997a, 1999) had no doubt that ‘the Serb invaders’ were not going to 
leave Kosovo out of their free will. Qosja dismissed that the Serb opposition could 
improve the position of the Albanians or grant them independence, because “All the 
Serb political parties defend the concept of the Great Serbia.” (Qosja 1994: 274) 
Qosja condemned as treason any attempt to co-operate with Serbia, or the Serb po-
litical parties and even worse to participate in the Serb parliamentary elections. Qosja 
argued that the participation in the elections was the recognition of the occupation. 
“None has the mandate to decide for the Albanians to continue their life under the 
Serb occupation.” (Qosja 1996: 220) 
The international community was the second force that influenced the resolution of 
the Albanian question. Qosja appreciated its role in defending the Albanians. “With-
out the continuing interest of the all-European institutions for us, the horrible situa-
tion of the Albanian nation in Yugoslavia, even unprecedented as it is in peace time, 
was going to be even worse”. (Qosja 1992: 20-21) However, Qosja (1994: 260) re-
gretted the fact that the Western powers “… did not support [the Albanian] demand 
for independence … [and advised that the Albanians] must accept Serbia”. 
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Simultaneously, Qosja returned to the traditional distrust and scepticism towards 
the European powers. Qosja ceased using the term New Wold Order and instead 
warned the Albanians not to take for granted the European support for the Albanian 
question. Qosja (1992: 26, 29) wrote, “We should not forget, in the meantime, that 
the hopes of small nations, quite often during their history have ended up in despera-
tion … we should not exclude every possibility for disappointment in the new Euro-
pean order. … I am afraid that even in future, the expressions: poor small man, poor 
small nation, poor small culture, are going to be proved true”. 
Qosja (1992: 89) believed that the international community “… shall play a very 
important role in the resolution of the Albanian question, but this role shall depend 
mostly from the Albanian factor. The more vigorous, decisive, and stronger is the 
Albanian factor, the more powerful the role of the European and international factor 
shall be, and vice versa.” Qosja (1996: 366) argued that the Albanians, through their 
active resistance had to convince the international community that “… the Albanians 
shall never be calm and the Balkans never shall be pacified without the right solution 
of the question… of the Albanian nation”. 
The most important factor to resolve the Albanian question was the activity of the 
Albanians in Kosovo. Qosja (1994, 1995e, 1996) continued to define the Albanian 
strategy as a challenge to Rugova and his “… disreputable and submissive political 
course towards Serbia, a course of nothing more than words”. (Qosja 1995b) Qosja 
(FISH 1996) argued that instead of intensifying the resistance, “… this diplomacy has 
only calmed down an entire historical national movement at the end of this century”. 
Qosja (1996: 151) argued that the effect of the LDK resistance was “… very pale be-
cause it is disobedience sitting down”. Qosja (1996: 416) argued that LDK pursued 
this policy not because it was smarter, but because LDK had turned into “A new po-
litical caste … that does not accept the idea of sacrifice”. Its goal was not to protect 
the nation from the Serb wrath, but rather to protect its own position and privileges. 
Qosja argued that Rugova was relying only on the help of the EU and USA to 
achieve independence. Rugova was “… spreading illusions that USA and the EU 
states are going to bring us freedom and independence … in our imagination they are 
become that over-natural creature”. (Qosja 1992: 129) Qosja demanded from Rugova 
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to face the truth: the international community was not supporting the independence of 
Kosovo. Rugova had to tell the truth to the Albanians, because “For a number of rea-
sons, it is always better to tell to the nation only the truth, independently of how 
much we like it or not”. (Qosja 1992: 130) 
Rugova was proud that LDK, with its policy, had preserved the nation and peace. 
Qosja (1996: 64) dismissed this idea, because “For the occupied, peace is not the 
most important value”. Qosja (1992: 130) declared that the most important value was 
freedom and the Albanians had to win their own freedom with their “… efforts, 
sweat, and sacrifices”. Qosja argued that to achieve independence “We must exploit 
all the ways of civil disobedience, as means of active resistance”. Qosja (1995b, 
1995c, 1996) claimed that the core of Ghandi peaceful resistance was the organised 
and active resistance: strikes, demonstrations and generally active resistance. Qosja 
(1996: 42) realised that the active resistance was dangerous and painful, but “The 
road to unification is the road of pain”. 
Slowly, Qosja began to contemplate the idea of the armed resistance. Qosja (1996: 
280) asked, “Can we continue endlessly with our peaceful resistance?” The answer 
was “The nations that cannot achieve their human, political and national rights … 
through peaceful, democratic means… are forced to wage war. War, hence, becomes 
a necessary evil; the nations that want to become master of their fate cannot escape 
from this evil.” (Qosja 1996: 280) Qosja (1996: 219) considered war as something 
horrible for the individuals and the nation, but moral, because if all the other forms of 
resistance fail than “the war remains a lawful means”. Qosja argued that to succeed in 
war, the Albanians had to be careful. “But for the war, we should be well prepared 
and we need foreign states to support us”. (Qosja 1996: 416) 
7.10 The post-Dayton strategy 
The first half of 1996 was characterised by mass euphoria about the Dayton agree-
ment and the opening of the US Information Centre in Prishtina. However, as the 
outer wall of sanctions was crumbling and the European leaders were putting pres-
sure on Rugova to start talks with Milošević, Qosja (1997a: 207) announced, “The 
time of deception is slowly coming to its end!” The events were proving that “The 
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question of Kosovo has entered a new phase, and in this phase, it is confirmed that 
the policy pursued by the LDK leadership has suffered a total failure”. (Qosja 1998a) 
Qosja (Lutovac 1996: 20) described the period after the Dayton accord as “… the 
end of illusion that the international community will honour the requests of the Alba-
nians for independence or unification with Albania”. Qosja (1997b) complained, 
“How can we be satisfied with their stance for as long as they do not promise Kosovo 
more than autonomy?” Qosja (1996, 1997a) explained the reluctance of the interna-
tional community to help the Albanians with the failed civil disobedience. The Alba-
nians had to learn from Croatia and Bosnia. They rebelled, fought for their national 
rights and compelled with their resistance the international community to intervene. 
Qosja described the present situation as the direct consequence of the policy pur-
sued by Rugova and LDK. Qosja (1997a: 33) declared, “In no case, I was going to 
defend this policy… first of all because its result until today is: the acceptance in 
practice of the oppression and exploitation of the Albanian nation”. Qosja (1998a) 
argued, “LDK is paralysed and dead” because Rugova “… has excluded completely 
the idea of sacrifice”. (Qosja 1997a: 470) 
Qosja (1997c, 1998a) warned that the most courageous people (i.e. former political 
prisoners) had already left LDK and the remaining leaders (Qosja hinted at Agani) 
were engaged in talks with the Serb representatives in New York and Belgrade. Qosja 
(1997a: 37) labelled these talks as a new effort to achieve a new “brotherhood and 
unity”. Qosja (1998b: 6) declared that any effort to accept less than independence 
was an act of betrayal, because “It was against the will of the nation expressed in the 
referendum”. 
Qosja argued that it was the time for the Albanians to decide about their strategy 
and consequently their future. “We are at the crossroad: where should we go?” (Qosja 
1997a: 208) Qosja was confident that the Albanians were not going to accept any 
compromise Rugova- Milošević. Qosja (1997a: 38) asked, “Is the nation going to 
accept this? The historical lesson is: No!” Qosja implied that another form of resis-
tance was needed to achieve the independence of Kosovo. Qosja (1997a: 35) re-
peated: “It is necessary to revive our national all-popular resistance”. There was little 
doubt what Qosja included in the notion “revival of the popular resistance” because 
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the Kosovo Liberation Army was already active. Qosja described the KLA as a con-
tinuance of the Albanian tradition of fighting for freedom. “The Albanian people 
have often had to defend themselves from the Serbs. It is not the first time that the 
Albanian blood is shed in Drenica.” (Magnussen 1998: 6) 
However, Qosja (1998c, 1998d, 1998e) was aware that KLA could not liberate 
Kosovo. Qosja argued that the goal of the armed resistance was not to force the Serb 
forces out of Kosovo, but rather to force “… a certain form of international armed 
intervention, and the deployment of an international protection force, as a precondi-
tion for preventing further escalation of the war, for finding a political solution of the 
Kosovo issue”. (Qosja 1998e) Qosja expected that the international community was 
going to act as it did in Bosnia: immediate ceasefire, the retreat of the Serb forces and 
the creation of an international protectorate over Kosovo. Qosja believed that during 
this phase the Serbs and the Albanians would engage in talks about the future of Kos-
ovo. Qosja (1998d) argued that, “The New Democratic League of Kosovo is for the 
peaceful solution of the question of Kosovo, after the Serb police and army forces 
leave the province and the participation of the international mediators is secured.” 
Quite differently, from Agani and Surroi that called upon the USA and EU to im-
pose a solution, Qosja advocated an active role during the talks at Rambouillet. The 
maximum demand for Qosja (1999: 131, 198) was a referendum about the political 
future of Kosovo after 3 to 5 years. “Together with the dislocation of a NATO force 
in Kosova, we consider as strategic the question of a referendum…. The question of 
the referendum is for us the most important, decisive question in the International 
Conference for Kosova.” However, Qosja was not sure if the Albanians could extract 
such promise in Rambouillet. Therefore, in case that the USA and EU threatened to 
stop the talks, Qosja was prepared to accept only the retreat of the Serb police and 
army forces and the international protectorate over Kosovo. The Albanians were go-
ing to be safe from their Serb occupiers, the connections with Serbia were going to 
weaken gradually and the Albanians could find another solution. 
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7.11 Summary 
Qosja rejected the idea that there was an ethnic conflict between the Albanians and 
the Serbs. The ethnic conflicts were not natural, inherent or predetermined, but rather 
created by the ruling class, i.e. the bourgeoisie. Milošević and the Serb Communist 
elite were guilty for creating a conflict in order to prolong their own rule and post-
pone the democratisation of Serbia/Yugoslavia. Qosja declared that Milošević repre-
sented an existential threat to the Albanians, because his final goal was the expulsion 
of the Albanians. In general, the Albanians were victims of Serbia, which denied to 
them the status of republic inside Yugoslavia. The political inequality was the root of 
the all the economic and social problems experienced by the Albanians in Kosovo. 
Qosja declared that the Albanians had never harmed Serbia and the Serbs and 
therefore, they bore no responsibility for the conflict. Qosja argued that the Albanians 
were a nation and they had the right to demand their own republic. The demand for 
the Republic of Kosovo neither created nor aggravated the conflict, because just and 
fair demands do not create conflicts. The Republic of Kosovo was going to mend the 
old imperialistic injustice, mitigate the Albanian fear of Milošević, improve the social 
and economic status of the Albanians, and create the right conditions for the democ-
ratisation of Yugoslavia. 
Qosja debated the unification as the only right solution, although the goal was the 
Republic of Kosovo. Qosja declared that the unification was his long-term goal. 
Qosja was optimist that the democratic Albania and Yugoslavia were going to be part 
of the European Union, effectually uniting the Albanians in one state. Qosja neither 
debated nor demanded the dissolution of Yugoslavia. As any other Albanian leader, 
Qosja believed that Milošević, a Communist turned nationalist, was a temporary phe-
nomenon. Milošević was going to give up under the internal and external pressure. 
Milošević’s demise was going to open the way for the institutional re-organisation of 
Yugoslavia, i.e. the Republic of Kosovo and the democratisation of Yugoslavia. 
As Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia, Qosja was 
quick to follow representing similar demands. Qosja considered the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia as natural, predetermined and inescapable. Qosja argued that Kosovo was 
under Serb occupation. Qosja demanded the unification of all the territories with an 
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Albanian majority (Albania + Albanians in Yugoslavia) in one state. Qosja argued 
that this was the best solution because the innate volition of each state is to create its 
own national state. Qosja declared unification was going to resolve any ethnic con-
flict and allow the national states to concentrate on their domestic problems, i.e. eco-
nomic development. However, because he got no support for his idea by the Albanian 
political leaders in Macedonia and Montenegro, Qosja modified his idea and de-
manded the unification of Albania and Kosovo.  
In the beginning, Qosja rejected the war or any armed action against Serb army 
and police. Simultaneously, Qosja called for an active resistance against Milošević 
and Serbia: demonstrations, strikes etc. Qosja believed that every victory had its own 
cost and every cost was acceptable to win the right of self-determination. Qosja criti-
cised the sense of euphoria shown by many Albanian leaders. Qosja agreed that a 
new set of principles was organising the international relations. He believed that the 
Great Powers had taken a new stance toward the Albanian question as part of the 
Yugoslav crisis. 
Qosja demanded from the Albanian political parties to co-ordinate their activities 
with those of the international community. He demanded a more active strategy in 
order to stimulate the international attention and intervention. Qosja declared that the 
goal of the Albanian political parties was to convince the international community 
that the only solution was the self-determination of all the Albanians in Yugoslavia. 
Qosja expected help from the international community, but the Albanians had to take 
the first step. Therefore, he demanded a more active stand in the form of strikes, dem-
onstrations etc. 
However, he concluded that the civil disobedience was not going to produce re-
sults. Qosja declared that the armed rebellion remained as the last alternative to win 
independence. Qosja warned that the Albanians had to find the right moment and to 
be well prepared. Qosja was the only Albanian leader to defend the armed action and 
the human cost of it. Qosja despised LDK and its satellites, because they had changed 
the soul of the Albanians. LDK had turned the Albanians into subservient creatures. 
Qosja pictured the opposite Albanian: proud, courageous, and self-sacrificing. 
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Qosja explained Dayton agreement as a clear proof that only one who dares wins. 
The agreement rewarded those who participated in the war and left out the Albanians. 
The international community praised the Albanians for their civil disobedience, but 
offered them nothing in return. Therefore, Qosja called again for an armed resurrec-
tion. He was well aware that the Albanians could not win the war. However, exactly 
as in Bosnia, the Serb counter-insurgency tactics were going to force the international 
community to interfere actively in conflict. Qosja saw Rambouillet as the coronation 
of his political activity. 
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8. THE POWER/KNOWLEDGE EFFECTS 
As pointed previously, discourse contains power because it produces knowledge, i.e. 
it decides what the norm is and what it is not. However, as Neumann (2001) shows 
discourses produce different power effects that influence our life at various degrees. 
Neumann (2001: 173) argues that, “The political is the battle about differences that 
make a difference”. Therefore, in this chapter, I shall not deal with every knowledge 
of the discourse (every representations that constituted a piece of knowledge), but 
with the most important ones that produced political effects in the life of the Albani-
ans in Kosovo during the period 1990- 1999. 
I would like to begin by pointing out that building and maintaining a discursive 
norm is an arduous discursive work that involves the repetition of the representations, 
and the invention and the use of different institutions and practices. However, if prop-
erly constructed and maintained, the discursive norms enjoy a certain degree of iner-
tia that prevents the creation of new discursive norms. The Yugoslav discourse cre-
ated two such norms that influenced the discourse of the Albanian discursive forma-
tions. The first norm defined nationalism as a danger and anti-revolutionary activity. 
All the Albanian leaders began their discourse by following this norm. They denied 
that they were nationalist or guided in their activity by nationalism. Instead, they 
spoke about defending natural national interest. The second discursive norm labelled 
the Albanian demand for the Republic of Kosovo as irredentism and as the first step 
towards the unification with Albania as chauvinism. Therefore, Rugova began his 
involvement in politics declaring his loyalty to Yugoslavia and denying that his goal 
was the independent Republic of Kosovo and even worse, the unification with Alba-
nia. Maliqi called the unification with Albania as natural, as late as 1995, long after 
Yugoslavia had dissolved. 
Similarly, the Albanian civil disobedience formation, as the main/dominant discur-
sive formation, produced its own knowledges that were represented as truth. The first 
of such discursive norms established a system of differentiation between the Albani-
ans and Milošević/the Serb Communist leadership. The system of differentiation es-
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tablished two categories of ethical subjects. Milošević was the power-obsessed Com-
munist leader that was facing increasing demands to relinquish power and allow the 
democratisation of Yugoslavia. Instead, he was trying to prolong his own rule by in-
venting an ethnic conflict. Milošević depicted the Albanians as a threat and a foreign 
element inside Serbia and Kosovo as integral part of Serbia. On the other side, the 
Albanian discourse created the other, the good Albanian as victim of Milošević trying 
to defend his national rights. The Albanian discourse identified Milošević as an exis-
tential threat to every Albanian because his goal was the destruction of the Albanian 
nation. The Albanian discourse represented mobilisation and resistance as a necessary 
(normal) behaviour towards Milošević and Serbia excluding any possibility for agree-
ment. All the Albanians had to participate in this final confrontation where the future 
of the Albanian nation was going to be decided. 
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the system of differentiation was slightly 
changed. It was a conflict between the occupier and the occupied. The system of dif-
ferentiation expanded to include not only the Serb leaders, but also the Serbs in gen-
eral and the Serbs living in Kosovo especially. They were depicted as ‘armed’ and 
‘part of the occupation force’ that were helping the Serb police and the army to sup-
press any act of opposition. 
The second discursive norm related to the goal of the Albanian movement in Kos-
ovo. The leadership of all the Albanian political parties in Yugoslavia foresaw three 
possible scenarios with three corresponding solution the Albanian question. How-
ever, although, the external borders of Yugoslavia changed, the Albanian political 
parties decided to change their goal. They decided to demand the Republic of Kosovo 
as their main demand instead of demanding the unification of all the Albanian territo-
ries in one state. It was not a simple change of goal because it admitted that the Alba-
nians in Macedonia and Montenegro were going to remain part of these two states 
and not join the independent Republic of Kosovo or the unified Albanian state. How 
did Rugova manage to change the goal of the Albanian movement without fearing 
and experiencing any normalisation effects that would undermine his position as 
leader? First, there was almost no resistance to this change. All the Albanian parties 
shared the same idea. The international community recognised Macedonia and Mon-
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tenegro and the change of their borders was impossible. Second, the change of the 
goal was approved by what was perceived as the proper authority, the Coordination 
Council of the Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia that included the Albanian 
political parties in Macedonia and Montenegro. Third, a massive discursive work 
paved the way for this political decision. From that moment and on, Rugova would 
repeat in every occasion that the only right solution for the Albanians was the inde-
pendent Republic of Kosovo. 
The parliamentary and presidential elections in Kosovo that resulted in a massive 
victory for the LDK and Rugova served to give legitimacy to his programme and his 
role as the president of Kosovo. Although, he did not have the monopoly of violence, 
Rugova enjoyed the complete respect of the Albanians as a moral figure. As the Al-
banian shadow institutions were taking shape, Rugova declared that the Republic of 
Kosovo existed and that it needed only the international recognition. Therefore, 
Rugova called for a policy of non-cooperation with the Serb institutions. 
The third discursive norm was that the independence of Kosovo was going to be 
achieved by a combination of civil resistance and international intervention. There 
was much debate between the LDK leaders as what was the best means to resist to the 
Serb occupation. However, once Rugova decided, the civil resistance became the 
norm. The main argument for this decision was the belief that Milošević was trying to 
provoke the Albanians in order use massive military power to accomplish the expul-
sion of the Albanians. 
Rugova argued that the duty of the LDK was to control the reactions of the Alba-
nians that faced massive abuse at the hands of the Serb police and army. The advice 
that Rugova gave to the Albanians was: Do not react. First, the LDK leaders suc-
ceeded in stopping the wave of strikes/demonstrations that had engulfed Kosovo in 
1990-1991. Second, after each police action, groups of LDK leaders and human right 
organisations would visit the place and try to stop any retaliatory action from the Al-
banians. LDK was so effective that there were no demonstrations between 1992 and 
1996. 
Rugova assured the Albanians that the USA and EU were going to intervene on 
behalf of the Albanians. USA and EU would feel morally obligated to stop the Serb 
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violence and reward the Albanians for their civic resistance. Rugova inflated the me-
dia with the alleged support of the international community for the question of Kos-
ovo. He repeated that the support of the USA and EU for the independence of Kos-
ovo was increasing and it was only a matter of time. 
The first challenge to the discursive norms established by the LDK leaders came 
from Maliqi. He proposed the participation of the Albanians in the Serb national elec-
tions. Maliqi argued that the participation of the Albanians in the Serb parliamentary 
elections could secure the victory of Panic and change the balance of power in Serbia. 
The proposal was met with massive condemnation by the LDK controlled media. The 
participation in the Serb elections was considered as giving legitimacy to the Serb 
institutions and consequently an unacceptable behaviour. Maliqi withdrew his pro-
posal, apologised, and even resigned from his position as the leader of the Social-
Democratic Party of Kosovo. Effectively, Maliqi was removed from the discursive 
arena as unacceptable and even untrustworthy. 
The second challenge against the LDK produced norms came after the Dayton 
agreement. Both the former leaders of the democratic formation and Qosja as repre-
sentative of the radical option challenged the policy followed by Rugova as it became 
clear that the international community was not supporting the independence of Kos-
ovo. Maliqi and Surroi made it clear that the independence of Kosovo did not have 
the support of the international community. They accused Rugova for following a 
policy blinded by its own naivety and futility. They demanded from Rugova to 
change the final goal of the Albanian movement and to engage in talks with 
Milošević. 
Qosja challenged Rugova from another point. The Republic of Kosovo was the 
right solution and the goal that the Albanians had to achieve. However, the policy of 
civil resistance had failed and it was time to review it and move to another form of 
resistance. Qosja referred to the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. Qosja claimed that the 
highest value was not peace and survival, but freedom and therefore, any active resis-
tance, including the armed insurrection was not only proper, but also morally right. 
Qosja argued that for as long as the Albanians wonted to live in freedom, the armed 
resistance as unavoidable. 
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Rugova was the prime constructer of these discursive norms. However, even he 
could not change or abandon those that easily. The discourse has a normalising effect 
even on the subject that creates it. Rugova faced the dilemma between less than inde-
pendence or war. Rugova opted for the first alternative and tried to enlist the support 
of Qosja and Demaci. Both refused to support him. By that time, the students were 
demonstrating in the streets of Prishtina and the KLA had engaged the Serb army and 
police. The Serb special police answered with its ill-famed counter-insurgency opera-
tions. Then NATO came! 
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11. ENDNOTES 
                                              
1 Sunde, Tom Daniel Øyrehagen (2000): “Kosovo: Krig og fred: på leit etter rasjonelle forklaringer på kri-
gen i Kosovo våren 1999” (Kosovo: War and Peace: Searching for rational explanations for the war in Kosovo 
in spring 1999), University of Oslo, Oslo. Nordberg, Erik (2001): “NATOs bruk av militærmakt i Kosovo, en 
fokusering på broken av trusler” (NATO’s use of military power in Kosovo, focused on the use of threats), 
University of Oslo, Oslo. Buraas, Vibeke (2002): “NATOs rolle i Kosovo-konflikten. En spillteoretisk analy-
se” (NATO’s role in the Kosovo conflict. A game theory analysis), University of Oslo, Oslo. 
2 A very interesting contribution to understand the role of the Serb intellectuals in the Yugoslav conflict is 
Dragović-Soso (2002). 
3 "The Thinker" (French: "Le Penseur") is one of Auguste Rodin's famous bronze sculptures. It depicts a 
man in sober meditation battling with a powerful internal struggle. It is sometimes used to represent philoso-
phy. 
4 Gjakova is a town in the eastern part of Kosovo, close to the Albanian border. The majority of the high 
Communist cadres came from this area. 
5 “The first and last goal of our movement is to secure the right of self-determination including secession 
for the areas inhabited by a majority of Albanians… which means that the first and the last goal of our move-
ment is the liberation of Albanian areas annexed by Yugoslavia and the unification of these regions with their 
mother, Albania”. (Article 1 of the Statute) 
6 Latter in the 90’s, some of the group members blamed the Albanian interference for the failure to co-
ordinate. However, they cannot give a reason why the Albanian intelligence service sabotaged the meeting. 
The Albanian side blames the parochial interests of group leaders and the personal failure of the Albanian 
mediator. 
7 Truth be told, political trials were organised concurrently in the other Republics also. The most known 
ones were those of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and Gojko Djogo in Serbia. The Yugoslav leadership felt that 
even political repression had to be divided somehow equally. However, the trials in Croatia and Serbia were 
different, because they were selective (in Kosovo, there were condemned 245 people during the period May-
September 1981), aimed at the members of intelligentsia, the sentences were shorter and usually pardoned after 
a short time. 
8 Differentiation was described as distancing from irredentism and nationalism. Many Albanian students 
were expelled from University of Prishtina; many Albanians were dismissed or expelled from LCY. 
9 The Memorandum was never finished. The Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts appointed in June 1985, a 
committee comprised of 16 members under the leadership of Antonije Isaković to draft the Memorandum. 
However, only few of its members participated actively during the drafting process. Dobrica Ćosić was not 
part of the committee, but he knew what was going on. Serb daily Večernje novosti (Evening news) published 
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on September 24th, 1986 excerpts from the unfinished document. We can only speculate as who leaked the 
document and why. 
10 In Serbian (here in Latin alphabet) “Niko ne sme da vas bije, vas niko ne sme da bije” has the tone of a 
paternal prohibition and assurance. (Pavković 2000:220, note 22) 
11 For the origin of this term see Dragosović-Saso (2002) note 1, p. 1 
12 Azem Vllasi, previously the leader of the Communist Youth of Yugoslavia, was at that time provincial 
leader of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia. 
13 Its organisers conceived the Association as an ideological heir of the Yugoslav Association for Philoso-
phy and Sociology and as part of the ‘new left’. 
14 Hereunder called LDK. 
15 The other Parties were: (1) The Social Democratic Party of Kosova led in 1990 by Muhamedin Kullashi, 
in 1990-1992 by Shkëlzen Maliqi and latter from Luljeta Pula Beqiri. The Party split in 1994 and Besim Bok-
shi led the fraction. (2) The Peasants’ Party of Kosova led by Hivzi Islami. (3) The Youth Parliament of Kos-
ova (latter changed the name to the Parliamentary Party of Kosova) led in 1990-1991 by Halil Matoshi, in 
1991-1993 by Veton Surroi, in 1993-1997 by Bajram Kosumi and from 1997 by Adem Demaçi. (4) The Alba-
nian Demo-Christian Party led by Lazër Krasniqi and latter by Mark Krasniqi. (5) The Forum of Albanian 
Intellectuals led by Rexhep Qosja. It functioned more as a club of ideas than as a traditional party. (6) The 
Party of National Unity led by Halil Alidemaj. 
16 Rugova, Ibrahim, interview in Zëri, 27 December 1997. 
17 The Yugoslav partisan forces killed his grandfather Rrustë Rugova and father Ukë Rugova on January 
10th, 1945. Ibrahim Rugova was born on December 2nd, 1944, in Cerrcë, municipality of Istog, Kosovo. 
18 The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was founded on 23.12.1989. 
19 Minister of the interior and head of the military intelligence ("OZNA") and political police ("UDBA") 
from 1945 until 1966. Ranković was ill famous between the Albanians for organising the Action for the gather-
ing of weapons in 1955. However, according to the documents, Ranković had visited Kosovo only four times 
during the period 1945-1966. (See note 8, also) 
20 As a member of the Academy of Science of Serbia, he was one of the developers of the ill-famous plan 
on expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans. 
21 The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts was a draft document produced by a 
committee of the Serbian Academy from 1985 to 1986. In September 1986, the draft was released to the pub-
lic. Among many in Yugoslavia, including Serbia, it was deemed as an expression of Serbian nationalism. 
22 Brioni Plenum was a meeting of the CC of LCY on July 1st, 1966. Tito condemned Ranković for his “eta-
tistic-bureaucratic conceptions and the negative activities of the secret police in Kosovo etc. 
23 Among the founders of UJDI in January 1989 in Zagreb were, from Kosovo, Muhamedin Kullashi and 
Shkëlzen Maliqi. 
24 The Appeal was written by Maliqi et al. and signed on January 23rd, 1990, by Veton Surroi, as leader of 
Prishtina branch of UJDI, Idriz Ajeti as leader of The Council for the Protection of Human rights and Liberties, 
and Isuf Berisha as leader of the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo. 
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25 SDP= Social-Democratic Party of Kosovo. 
26 The petition was signed by 400,000 Albanians.  
27 Qosja was born in 1936 in Vuthaj, district of Plava and Gucia. The district is today part of Montenegro. 
28 Qosja completed his post-graduate studies at University of Belgrade in 1971. 
29 Qosja emphasised that he wrote 18 books during the period 1967-1990, and another 6 during the period 
1990-1999. 
30 The Austrian Foreign Minister. 
31 On July 5th, 1990, the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Serbia interrupted the session of the Par-
liament of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. 
